Credential Recovery Architecture for SRP Key Exposure Protection
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing cryptographic protocols for secure remote password (SRP) exchange protocols expose cryptographic keys, compromising security and making it crucial to protect these keys to ensure secure credential management.
Innovation Solution
An electronic device encrypts credentials and authentication information using protection and recovery keys, which are further encrypted with public and symmetric keys, and transmitted to a server for secure storage and recovery, involving a security device for re-encryption and decryption to ensure secure credential management.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If cryptographic keys are used for secure authentication, then security is improved, but the risk of key exposure increases
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication system is segmented into multiple independent components: the client device stores a first cryptographic key, the server stores a second cryptographic key, and a secret value is distributed between them. This segmentation ensures that no single entity possesses the complete authentication credentials, thereby preventing key exposure while maintaining security.
Solution Approach 2:
A secret value acts as an intermediary between the client and server keys. During authentication, this secret value enables the server to verify the client's identity without directly exposing either cryptographic key. The secret value mediates the authentication process, allowing security verification while protecting the actual keys from exposure.
2Ease of operation
If passwords are registered in servers, then authentication capability is improved, but password security is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The actual password is extracted from the server environment and replaced with a secret value that is distributed between client and server. The server no longer stores or processes the actual password, but instead verifies authentication based on the secret value and its second cryptographic key. This extraction eliminates the security vulnerability of storing passwords on the server while maintaining authentication capability.
Solution Approach 2:
Instead of storing the actual password on the server, a cryptographic copy or representation (the secret value combined with the second key) is maintained. This copy enables authentication verification without requiring the original password to be present on the server, thus preserving authentication capability while enhancing security.
3Device complexity
If cryptographic keys are exposed during protocol execution, then protocol simplicity is improved, but security is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
Cryptographic keys are generated and distributed in advance through a key establishment phase before the actual authentication protocol execution. The client receives the first key and secret value, while the server receives the second key and secret value during an initial setup. This preliminary action ensures that keys are never transmitted or exposed during the authentication protocol itself, maintaining both security and protocol simplicity.
Data Source
AI summary
An electronic device obtains lock release information of the electronic device from a user, generates authentication information and a wrapping key based on the lock release information, generates a protection key and a recovery key to encrypt and decrypt the authentication information and credentials stored in the electronic device, encrypts the authentication information, the credentials, and the protection key based on keys of the electronic device including the protection key and the recovery key, and transmits the encrypted credentials, the encrypted authentication information, and the encrypted protection key to a server performing a secure remote password (SRP) protocol with the electronic device.