Cross-Chain Transaction Privacy via Hashed Timelock Intermediaries
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Solution Overview
Problem
Cross-chain transactions in blockchain systems often compromise privacy, as hashed timelocks link transactions across public and private chains, revealing sensitive data to all participants, and existing solutions fail to maintain privacy while ensuring transaction atomicity.
Innovation Solution
The proposed solution uses two different secret keys on each blockchain, with one party generating a second secret by encrypting the first secret with the public key of the second party, hashing it, and providing a zero-knowledge proof to verify the linkage without disclosing secrets, thus preserving privacy and maintaining transaction atomicity.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If hashed timelocks are used to link transactions across public and private chains, then transaction atomicity is ensured, but privacy is compromised as sensitive data is revealed to all participants
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces an intermediary hashing mechanism that mediates between the public chain and private chain. Instead of directly linking transactions through visible hashed timelocks, a cryptographic hash function acts as an intermediary that obscures the connection. The hash of the secret (hash(secret)) is published on the public chain, while the actual secret remains private, allowing verification without revealing sensitive information.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent extracts the sensitive secret information from the public domain by separating what is published (hash(secret)) from what remains private (secret). This extraction allows the system to maintain transaction linkage verification on the public chain while keeping the actual transaction details and sensitive data confined to the private chain, thus preserving privacy while ensuring atomicity.
2Reliability
If cross-chain transaction linkage is implemented, then transaction integrity is maintained, but sensitive data is exposed to all participants
Solution Approach 1:
The patent changes the parameter of information representation by transforming sensitive data into its cryptographic hash form. Instead of publishing raw or directly verifiable transaction linkages, the system publishes hash values that maintain verification capability while fundamentally altering the information state to prevent sensitive data exposure. This parameter change enables integrity verification without confidentiality loss.
3Reliability
If traditional hashed timelock contracts are used, then transaction atomicity is guaranteed, but privacy protection is insufficient
Solution Approach 1:
The patent adds a dimensional layer of cryptographic abstraction between the public and private chains. Instead of direct one-to-one transaction linkage in the same dimension, the system creates a hashed intermediary dimension that allows verification across chains without direct exposure. This dimensional change enables atomicity across public and private chains while adding a protective layer that preserves participant privacy.
Data Source
AI summary
An example operation may include one or more of storing a first hashed timelock request in a first storage structure, where the first hashed timelock request is hashed based on a first secret, generating a second secret based on the first secret and a public key of a client, hashing the second secret to generate a hashed second secret, and transmitting a request for a second hashed timelock request to the client, where the request comprises the generated hashed second secret.