CRPA GNSS Spoofing Detection Through Multi-Pattern SNR Scans

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Existing GNSS systems are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, particularly replay attacks, which can disrupt communication and positioning systems without being easily detected, making it difficult to regain radio connection and maintain trusted position and time data.

Innovation Solution

A method and system using controlled reception pattern antennas (CRPAs) to generate multiple reception patterns, compare signal-to-noise ratios before and after scans, and detect spoofing by identifying differences in these ratios, verifying satellite presence, and correcting time based on reliable satellite signals.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Object-affected harmful factors

If CRPA antennas are used to suppress jamming signals, then protection against RF interference is improved, but vulnerability to replay spoofing attacks increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvejamming signal suppressionVSAvoidspoofing attack resistance
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary actions by conducting multiple scans with different reception patterns before final signal acceptance. The method executes a first scan with a first reception pattern, then a second scan with a second reception pattern, and compares the results to detect spoofing attacks before trusting the position data.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements feedback by comparing signal-to-noise ratios from multiple scans with different reception patterns. The control unit analyzes the differences between first and second scan results, using this feedback information to detect replay attacks and determine whether to trust the received position data.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

2Measurement precision

If multiple scans with different reception patterns are performed, then spoofing detection capability is improved, but time to acquire reliable position data increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvespoofing detection accuracyVSAvoidtime to acquire position data
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The system applies partial action by performing a limited number of scans (first and second scans) with different reception patterns rather than exhaustive scanning. This partial scanning approach provides sufficient spoofing detection capability while minimizing the time loss for position data acquisition.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

3Measurement precision

If signal-to-noise ratio comparison is used for spoofing detection, then detection accuracy is improved, but system complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvespoofing detection accuracyVSAvoidsignal processing complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The system extracts the key discriminating feature (signal-to-noise ratio) from the received signals and uses only this extracted parameter for spoofing detection. By focusing on this single extracted feature rather than analyzing all signal characteristics, the system achieves accurate spoofing detection while keeping the processing complexity manageable.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Data Source

PatentUS20260043924A1Trusted PNT solution by CRPA assisted GNSS spoofing protection
Publication Date: 2026.02.12 ROCKWELL COLLINS DEUTLAND
  • US20260043924A1 patent drawing
  • US20260043924A1 patent drawing
  • US20260043924A1 patent drawing

AI summary

A method of detecting a spoofing attack on a GNSS receiver provided on a vehicle is described herein. The method comprises: providing an antenna (12) having a controllable reception pattern, said GNSS receiver (16), a plurality of satellites (14) and a control unit (13), generating, via said control unit (13) a first antenna reception pattern of said antenna (12), performing a first scan of said plurality of said satellites (14) and receiving, via said GNSS receiver (16) a first set of said GNSS signals and a first set of signal-to-noise ratios from each of said plurality of satellites (14), and generating, via said control unit, a second reception pattern of said antenna (12), perform a second scan of said plurality of satellites (14) and receiving a second set of said GNSS signals and a second set of signal-to-noise ratios from said plurality of satellites (14), and comparing, via said control unit, said first set of signal-to-noise ratios with said second set of signal-to-noise ratios and detecting a difference between said first and second set of signal-to-noise ratios, and based on said detection of said difference in signal-to-noise ratios, determining, via said control unit (13), whether or not said difference indicates said spoofing attack on said GNNS receiver has occurred.