Cryptographic Device Anti-Crack Protection Circuit

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing cryptographic devices are vulnerable to side channel attacks, particularly differential power analysis, due to their reliance on additional hardware circuits for balanced power consumption and independent random number sources, which are costly and complex.

Innovation Solution

A cryptographic device and method that generates an anti-crack protection signal using a hash calculation circuit and shift register processing circuit to process messages and secret keys, effectively hiding the time of secret key processing and masking operations without requiring independent random number sources or complex power consumption designs.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If hiding approach is used to defend against differential power analysis, then power consumption information becomes irrelevant to actual computation, but additional hardware circuits are required for fabricating balanced power consumption

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity against side channel attacksVSAvoidadditional hardware circuits
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent creates a virtual copy of the random number generation function using hash calculation. Instead of requiring physical hardware circuits to generate random numbers, the system uses a hash function to generate a virtual random number that has the same statistical properties and security characteristics as a true random number. This copying approach eliminates the need for additional hardware while maintaining security against side channel attacks.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

Solution Approach 2:

The patent replaces the mechanical hardware-based random number generation system with a software-based hash calculation system. The physical hardware circuits that would generate random numbers are substituted with a mathematical hash function that processes input data to produce a pseudorandom output. This substitution eliminates the hardware complexity while preserving the security function.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #28Mechanics substitution (Replace mechanical system)

2Reliability

If masking approach is used to defend against differential power analysis, then logic calculations are performed on masked key or message, but independent random number sources are required

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity against side channel attacksVSAvoidindependent random number sources
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent merges the random number generation function with the hash calculation function. Instead of having separate hardware components for random number generation and cryptographic processing, the system combines these functions by using the hash calculation output as the source of randomness for masking operations. This integration eliminates the need for independent random number sources while maintaining the security requirements for masking.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #5Merging (Combining)

Solution Approach 2:

The hash calculation circuit serves multiple functions simultaneously: it generates the masking value for the masking approach, provides the anti-crack protection signal, and ensures security against side channel attacks. This multi-functionality eliminates the need for dedicated random number generation hardware, as the hash circuit performs all necessary cryptographic functions.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

3Productivity

If traditional cryptographic processing is used, then computation speed is maintained, but vulnerability to side channel attacks increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecomputation speedVSAvoidside channel attacks
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by generating the anti-crack protection signal through hash calculation before the actual cryptographic processing occurs. The hash function processes the secret key and message to create a masking value that is then applied to protect against side channel attacks during the subsequent cryptographic operations. This preliminary protection step is integrated into the processing flow without significantly impacting overall computation speed.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS10110375B2Cryptographic device and secret key protection method
Publication Date: 2018.10.23 MEDIATEK INC
  • US10110375B2 patent drawing
  • US10110375B2 patent drawing
  • US10110375B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A cryptographic device and a secret key protection method are provided. The cryptographic device protects a secret key of the cryptographic device when processing a message. The cryptographic device includes: a secret key protection circuit, configured to generate an anti-crack protection signal according to the message and the secret key by a hash calculation circuit; and a cryptographic processor, configured to process the message and the secret key according to the anti-crack protection signal to generate an encrypted message.