Crypto-Processor Power Randomization Against Side-Channel Attacks
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Solution Overview
Problem
Cryptographic devices are vulnerable to simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA) attacks, which can extract secret information by analyzing power consumption, despite the use of strong cryptographic algorithms.
Innovation Solution
Executing cryptographic algorithm computations using both genuine and false keys across multiple crypto-processors to randomize power consumption, making it difficult for attackers to successfully perform SPA or DPA analysis.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If cryptographic algorithms are implemented in a cryptographic device, then data encryption and security functions are provided, but the device becomes vulnerable to SPA and DPA attacks through power consumption analysis
Solution Approach 1:
The cryptographic computation is divided into multiple segments executed by different crypto-processors. Each processor handles a portion of the encryption operation, allowing the system to randomize which processor executes which segment with which key, thereby obscuring the power consumption patterns that would otherwise reveal the secret key.
Solution Approach 2:
The invention creates copies of the cryptographic computation using multiple crypto-processors that execute the same algorithm with different keys. These computational copies produce different power consumption patterns, and by randomizing which copy is used, the system makes it difficult for attackers to correlate power consumption with the actual secret key.
2Object-affected harmful factors
If multiple crypto-processors are used to execute cryptographic computations with different keys, then power consumption randomization is achieved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
Multiple crypto-processors are designed with identical or similar functional capabilities, each able to execute the full cryptographic algorithm. This universality allows any processor to handle any computational segment with any key, providing flexibility for randomization while maintaining a standardized, manageable architecture rather than requiring specialized different components.
3Object-affected harmful factors
If cryptographic computations are executed with both genuine and false keys across multiple processors, then power consumption patterns are randomized, but computation time may increase
Solution Approach 1:
The system employs periodic randomization where the selection of which crypto-processor executes which computational segment with which key changes periodically or for each operation. This periodic variation in execution patterns randomizes both power consumption and timing characteristics, making time-based side channel attacks ineffective while maintaining efficient computation through the use of identical algorithms across processors.
Data Source
AI summary
A method is for operating a cryptographic device to reduce effects of power analysis and time attacks. The method may include executing a first set of cryptographic algorithm computations with a first crypto-processor of the cryptographic device. The first set of cryptographic algorithm computations may provide encryption of a first set of data to be protected with a first secret key stored in the cryptographic device. The method may further include executing a second set of cryptographic algorithm computations with a second crypto-processor of the cryptographic device for providing encryption of a second set of data different from the first set of data to be protected with a second different secret key.