Cryptographic Ballot Verification System with Duress Tokens
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing election systems face challenges in maintaining anonymity, severability, equity, and trustworthiness, particularly in large-scale elections where scalability and secret ballot requirements conflict with the need for voters to verify their ballots and ensure the integrity of the audit process.
Innovation Solution
The system allows voters to cast two ballots, one real and one duress, with the voter retaining a token for their real ballot, enabling verification post-election and using biometric tokens and cryptographic methods to ensure equity and trust, while maintaining anonymity and preventing coercion.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If a secret ballot system is implemented where ballots are counted without voter verification, then anonymity and severability are maintained, but trustworthiness is compromised as voters cannot verify their ballots were counted accurately
Solution Approach 1:
The ballot is segmented into two separate components: a public ballot that can be verified by anyone and a private receipt that proves the voter's specific ballot was counted. The public ballot contains aggregate vote information that can be audited, while the private receipt links to the individual ballot in the database, allowing the voter to verify their specific vote without revealing how they voted to others.
Solution Approach 2:
A cryptographic receipt acts as an intermediary between the voter and the ballot counting system. The receipt contains a unique identifier and cryptographic proof that allows the voter to verify their ballot was counted without directly accessing or revealing the ballot content. This intermediary enables trustworthiness while maintaining the secret ballot requirement.
2Productivity
If ballots are distributed and counted in a centralized system, then scalability is improved, but anonymity is compromised as voters cannot observe the counting process
Solution Approach 1:
The system creates a cryptographic copy of the ballot verification process that can be independently verified by voters. Instead of requiring voters to physically observe the counting process, the system generates a verifiable receipt that contains all the information a voter would need to verify their ballot was counted correctly, allowing scalability while maintaining anonymity through digital verification.
3Device complexity
If a single ballot system is used, then device complexity is reduced, but trustworthiness is compromised as there is no mechanism for voters to verify counting accuracy
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary cryptographic actions during ballot casting by generating and storing a unique identifier and cryptographic proof in the database. This preliminary action enables later verification without requiring complex verification mechanisms at counting time. The receipt is prepared in advance with all necessary verification information embedded, simplifying the overall system while enabling thorough verification.
Data Source
AI summary
The present invention comprises a system and method of conducting a publicly auditable election using secret ballots. The invention allows an elector to verify their ballot has been counted towards the result of an election in the manner in which it was cast. The elector is capable of cryptographically proving if their ballot has been altered or deleted. Any interested individual or entity is capable of auditing the election using an anonymized database of published ballots.