Cryptographic Device Event-Based One-Time Passcode Administrative Access
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Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional cryptographic devices rely on static PIN Unlock Keys (PUKs) for administrative access, which, once compromised, irreversibly destroy the device's security.
Innovation Solution
Implementing event-based one-time passcodes (OTPs) for administrative access, where the cryptographic device maintains an event counter and uses an administrative seed value to generate an expected OTP, comparing it with the received OTP to grant or deny access.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If a static access code (PUK) is used for administrative access, then ease of operation is improved, but security is worsened because the code remains compromised if exposed
Solution Approach 1:
The patent transforms the static access code into a dynamic, time-varying OTP that changes with each administrative access attempt. The OTP is generated based on a counter value that increments with each successful access, making the access code dynamic rather than static. This resolves the contradiction by maintaining ease of operation (administrators can still access the device) while improving security (the code changes each time, preventing reuse of compromised codes).
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements periodic regeneration of the access code through the counter mechanism. Each successful administrative access increments the counter, and the OTP is regenerated based on the new counter value. This periodic action ensures that the access code is not static but refreshes with each use, maintaining security while allowing continuous administrative access.
2Device complexity
If a static access code is used, then device complexity is reduced, but security is worsened due to irreversibility of compromise
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces dynamic elements (counter, OTP generation function) to replace the static access code. This increases device complexity slightly but dramatically improves security. The dynamic counter and OTP generation mechanism ensure that even if an OTP is compromised, it cannot be reused, resolving the irreversibility problem of static codes.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent changes the parameter of the access code from static to dynamic by introducing time/counter-based variation. The OTP is no longer a fixed value but changes based on the counter value, which increments with each access. This parameter change maintains ease of operation while preventing permanent compromise.
3Reliability
If event-based OTPs are implemented, then security is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements self-service by having the device itself maintain the counter and generate the expected OTP internally. The cryptographic device uses its own resources (processor, memory) to track the counter value and compute the expected OTP, eliminating the need for external authentication servers or complex infrastructure. This self-service approach improves security while minimizing the increase in device complexity.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces the counter as an intermediary element between the static seed and the dynamic OTP. The counter serves as a mediator that transforms the static administrative seed into time-varying OTPs. This intermediary mechanism simplifies the overall system architecture by providing a straightforward way to generate varying codes without complex cryptographic protocols.
Data Source
AI summary
A cryptographic device comprises a processor coupled to a memory and is configured to maintain an event counter characterizing a number of successful administrative accesses to the cryptographic device. The cryptographic device is further configured to receive an event-based one-time passcode for a given administrative access attempt, to compare the received event-based one-time passcode to an expected event-based one-time passcode determined as a function of a current value of the event counter, and to grant or deny the given administrative access attempt based at least in part on a result of the comparing. The cryptographic device may store an administrative seed value, with the expected event-based one-time passcode being determined as a function of the administrative seed value and the current value of the event counter. The cryptographic device illustratively comprises a smartcard, a hardware or software authentication token, an Internet-of-Things (IoT) device, or other type of processor-based device having an administrative access interface.