Cryptographic Masking Conversion With Forced Carry Bit Flow

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing cryptographic algorithms face challenges in protecting against side channel attacks, particularly in algorithms combining Boolean and arithmetic functions, due to the need for conversions between different masking schemes which are computationally expensive and vulnerable to side-channel attacks.

Innovation Solution

A method is introduced that forces a specific type of calculation to always result in a set carry bit by extending the parameters of Boolean and arithmetic masking schemes, ensuring a uniform and data-independent program flow, thereby reducing the visibility of side-channel attacks.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If conversion between Boolean masking and arithmetic masking is performed, then protection against side channel attacks is improved, but computational complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveprotection against side channel attacksVSAvoidcomputational complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts the problematic conversion step between Boolean and arithmetic masking schemes and removes it by operating entirely within the arithmetic masking domain. This eliminates the source of computational complexity while maintaining protection against side channel attacks through consistent arithmetic masking throughout the cryptographic operations.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent changes the masking parameter representation by extending the bit-length of arithmetic masking parameters. By using extended precision arithmetic masking (e.g., operating with n+1 bits instead of n bits), the patent enables secure operations without requiring conversion to Boolean masking, thus reducing computational complexity while maintaining security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

2Reliability

If multiple masking scheme conversions are performed, then security against differential power analysis is improved, but processing time increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveprotection against differential power analysisVSAvoidprocessing time
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The patent maintains continuous operation within the arithmetic masking domain without interrupting the computational flow for masking scheme conversions. By keeping all operations (AND, OR, XOR, addition, multiplication) within the same arithmetic masking framework, the patent eliminates time-consuming conversion steps while maintaining continuous cryptographic processing and security protection.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #20Continuity of useful action

3Stability of the object's composition

If parameters are extended to force set carry bit, then uniform program flow is achieved, but data processing complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveuniform program flowVSAvoiddata processing complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Stability of the object's compositionVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent solves the carry bit problem by adding an extra dimension (bit) to the parameter representation. By extending parameters from n bits to n+1 bits, the patent creates additional space to force the carry bit to a fixed value (typically 0), thereby achieving uniform program flow. This dimensional extension allows arithmetic operations to proceed with predictable carry behavior without complex conditional logic.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #17Another dimension (Dimensionality change)

Data Source

PatentUS12512971B2Processing of cryptographic data
Publication Date: 2025.12.30 INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG
  • US12512971B2 patent drawing
  • US12512971B2 patent drawing
  • US12512971B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Solutions described herein refer to cryptographic data processing, utilizing a first masking scheme of a shared secret and a second masking scheme of the shared secret, wherein a transformation from the first masking scheme to the second masking scheme is conducted by forcing one type of calculation among at least two types of calculations.