Cryptographic Vote Tagging for Verifiable Elections
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing voting systems face challenges in ensuring both voter privacy and verifiability, particularly in large-scale elections, where the integrity and transparency of the voting process are compromised.
Innovation Solution
A computer-implemented method and system that uses encryption and unique keys to verify and count votes, ensuring that each vote is recorded and counted accurately while maintaining voter privacy through independent ballot and verification machines.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Measurement precision
If electronic voting systems are used to enable voter verification, then verifiability is improved, but voter privacy is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The system divides the voting process into separate functional components: a ballot machine that records votes and generates cryptographic proofs, a verification machine that validates votes, and a result tabulation system. This segmentation allows verification functions to be performed without exposing voter identities, as each component handles specific tasks independently.
Solution Approach 2:
Cryptographic intermediaries (proofs and tags) are introduced as mediators between the voter's vote and the verification system. These cryptographic elements enable verification of vote integrity without revealing voter identity or vote content, acting as an intermediary that preserves privacy while enabling verification.
2Reliability
If paper audit trails are used to enhance security, then system integrity is improved, but transparency and accountability are reduced due to random sampling
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary cryptographic verification of all votes during the voting process itself, rather than relying on post-hoc paper trail verification. Each vote is verified through cryptographic proofs generated at the time of voting, enabling complete transparency without requiring random sampling of paper trails.
Solution Approach 2:
The system replaces the mechanical paper trail verification system with cryptographic verification mechanisms. Instead of physically counting and verifying paper ballots through random sampling, the system uses cryptographic proofs and digital verification to ensure integrity of all votes, providing complete transparency and accountability.
3Measurement precision
If cryptographic E2E voting systems are implemented to prove integrity, then verifiability is improved, but system complexity and ease of understanding deteriorate
Solution Approach 1:
The system uses cryptographic copying where the ballot machine creates cryptographic copies (proofs and tags) of the vote data that can be independently verified. These cryptographic copies enable verification of vote integrity without requiring stakeholders to understand the underlying cryptographic algorithms, simplifying the user interface while maintaining security.
4Measurement precision
If random sampling of EVMs is used for paper trail counting, then some verification is achieved, but system integrity cannot be guaranteed in all scenarios
Solution Approach 1:
The system implements continuous verification of all votes through cryptographic proofs generated for each vote, rather than intermittent verification through random sampling. This continuous verification ensures that every vote can be validated, providing guaranteed integrity for the entire election rather than just a statistical sample.
Data Source
AI summary
In an embodiment, a computer implemented method for verifying and counting a vote cast by a voter is provided. The method includes recording, by a ballot machine, the vote cast by the voter via a first I/O interface for a corresponding candidate out of a plurality of candidates. An encryption of a vote tag is generated based on a preceding tag, a unique key generated in response to initializing the ballot machine and the candidate constant assigned based on the vote cast by the voter for the corresponding candidate. The encrypted vote tag is scanned to retrieve information of the vote tag from the encrypted vote tag. A confirmation including a replication of the vote recorded at the ballot machine for the corresponding candidate, in response to scanning the encrypted vote tag is provided by the verification machine. The total number of vote tags recorded are counted to tabulate results.