Cryptoprocessor Power Segmentation for Data Security

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Existing electronic systems with random access memory face challenges in protecting sensitive data from unauthorized access, particularly due to vulnerabilities in backup power sources and potential data recovery from remanence phenomena during power failures or voltage variations.

Innovation Solution

An integrated electronic circuit with a first RAM for storing data, a processing module for erasing data, and a second RAM for storing an encryption key, utilizing a capacitive element connected to the processing module to detect unauthorized access attempts based on power signal variations and prevent rapid discharge, ensuring secure data erasure.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If a backup power source is provided to maintain operation during power failures, then data retention and security device operation are ensured, but the risk of unauthorized access to the emergency power source increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata retention during power failureVSAvoidunauthorized access to backup power source
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent divides the power supply system into two separate power sources: a main power source for normal operation and a backup power source for emergency situations. This segmentation allows the backup power source to be isolated and protected from unauthorized access while maintaining its function for legitimate emergency operations.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces an intermediary mechanism (power management circuitry and control logic) that mediates between the backup power source and the rest of the system. This intermediary controls when and how the backup power source is activated, preventing unauthorized direct access while ensuring proper operation during genuine emergencies.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Object-affected harmful factors

If the emergency power source is deactivated to prevent unauthorized access, then security against power source intrusion is improved, but the cryptoprocessor operation stops without erasing sensitive data

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveprotection against unauthorized accessVSAvoiddata erasure capability during power failure
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements preliminary action by preparing the backup power source in advance with controlled access mechanisms. The system pre-configures power management circuits and control logic that will automatically activate the backup power source only under specific emergency conditions, ensuring both security and reliability without requiring deactivation.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent uses parameter changes by monitoring power supply conditions (voltage levels, power failure detection) to dynamically control the activation state of the backup power source. The system transitions between different operational states based on detected parameters, enabling secure activation only when genuine emergencies occur while preventing unauthorized access.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

3Object-affected harmful factors

If the emergency power supply voltage is varied to disturb cryptoprocessor operation, then unauthorized access is prevented, but sensitive data remains accessible in the memory

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveprevention of unauthorized accessVSAvoiddata security in memory
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSLoss of information

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts the encryption key from the main memory system and stores it separately in a secure element that is exclusively powered by the backup power source. This extraction ensures that even if the main power source is compromised or varied, the sensitive data remains protected by the isolated key storage that can only be accessed through the secure backup power pathway.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces a new dimensional layer of security by creating a separate power domain for key storage that is independent from the main power supply. This dimensional separation means that voltage variations or disturbances in the main power source do not affect the isolated backup power source, thereby protecting the encrypted data in a different operational dimension.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #17Another dimension (Dimensionality change)

Applied Scientific Principles

This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.

Function Achieved in This Case

The solution effectively prevents unauthorized access to sensitive data by securely erasing the key and potentially all data stored in the first RAM, even during power failures or voltage variations, thereby maintaining data security and integrity.

Implementation Method 1

a capacitive element connected to the processing module to detect unauthorized access attempts based on power signal variations

Methodology Applied
Scientific EffectCapacitance: Capacitance

Data Source

PatentEP2162846B1Cryptoprocessor with improved data protection
Publication Date: 2018.04.18 COMPAGNIE INDUSTRIELLE ET FINANCIERE D INGENIERIE INGENICO SA
  • EP2162846B1 patent drawingFigure 1~2

AI summary

The invention relates to an electronic circuit (30) comprising: a first random-access data storage element (14), a processing module (16) designed to delete the first storage element, and an access terminal (B4) which is connected to the processing module and receives a first power signal (VDD_BU) supplied by a first power source (P, C1) external to the electronic circuit. The circuit also includes a second random-access storage element (32) in which a key is stored, said key being used to encrypt the data, and a second power source (C2) which is built into the electronic circuit and supplies a second power signal (VAl) to the processing module. The processing module is designed to detect an unauthorised access attempt by comparing the first and second power signals and to delete the key when the processing module is powered by the second power source.