Dark Order Block Auctions Using Midpoint Reference Pricing

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Solution Overview

Problem

Dark order block trades face issues of information leakage and gaming, which degrade liquidity quality, necessitating improved auctioning mechanisms to maintain integrity.

Innovation Solution

The system conducts an auction by creating an auction based on monitored market activity, transmitting notifications to participants, building an order book, and filling orders using a reference price calculated as the midpoint of bid and ask prices.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Productivity

If dark order block trades are conducted away from central exchanges, then liquidity access is improved, but information leakage and gaming risks increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveliquidity accessVSAvoidinformation leakage risk
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces an intermediary auction system that sits between dark order block trades and the public market. The auction system receives orders from multiple participants, builds an order book, and executes trades through a reference price mechanism. This intermediary structure allows liquidity to be accessed efficiently while preventing direct information leakage to the public market, as the auction system acts as a buffer that processes trades without revealing participant identities or order details to external observers.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Productivity

If dark order block trades are conducted away from central exchanges, then liquidity access is improved, but gaming potential increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveliquidity accessVSAvoidgaming potential
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements a feedback mechanism through the reference price calculation and order book system. The reference price is derived from midpoint bid and ask prices in the financial market, providing a market-based feedback signal that prevents gaming. Participants cannot manipulate prices arbitrarily because the reference price is anchored to actual market conditions. The order book also provides feedback by showing aggregate demand and supply without revealing individual participant intentions, creating a self-regulating system that reduces gaming potential while maintaining liquidity efficiency.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

3Reliability

If auction mechanisms are introduced for dark order block trading, then trading integrity is improved, but system complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvetrading integrityVSAvoidauction system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the trading system into distinct functional modules: an order reception component that collects dark orders, an order book management component that stores and organizes orders, a reference price calculation component that determines execution prices, and an order filling component that executes trades. This segmentation allows each module to perform its function independently and reliably, reducing overall system complexity while maintaining trading integrity. The modular structure also makes the system easier to audit and regulate, further supporting integrity without proportionally increasing complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Data Source

PatentUS12380502B2Auctioning mechanisms for dark order block trading
Publication Date: 2025.08.05 NYSE HLDG LLC
  • US12380502B2 patent drawing
  • US12380502B2 patent drawing
  • US12380502B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Auctioning mechanisms adapted to improve the integrity of dark order block trading are provided.