Data Plane OS Trusted Isolation Through Address-Hidden Access
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Solution Overview
Problem
The existing data plane operating system (OS) architecture lacks a security isolation mechanism, making it vulnerable to attacks that can compromise the integrity and privacy of critical assets such as critical data and code, as applications and the data plane OS kernel run at the same level, allowing attackers to exploit vulnerabilities.
Innovation Solution
Implement a trusted execution environment with address hiding and protection mechanisms, using an intermediate component to securely access critical assets, and configure memory protection to prevent unauthorized access and tampering, ensuring security isolation without additional level switching.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Productivity
If applications and data plane OS kernel run at the same level to achieve high performance, then processing speed is improved, but security isolation is lost making critical assets vulnerable to attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the data plane OS into untrusted components (applications and OS kernel) and trusted components (critical assets), allowing them to run at the same execution level while maintaining security boundaries through controlled access mechanisms
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediate component that acts as a mediator between untrusted and trusted components. This intermediary controls access to critical assets, enabling high-performance same-level execution while preventing direct attacks on trusted components through the use of indirect access paths and address hiding mechanisms
2Reliability
If security isolation mechanisms are added to protect critical assets, then security is improved, but system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The intermediate component provides security isolation without requiring complex hardware virtualization or multiple execution levels. By using a simple intermediary layer with address hiding and controlled access, the patent achieves security with minimal architectural complexity
Solution Approach 2:
The patent changes the access parameters (addresses, permissions) dynamically to protect critical assets. By hiding real addresses and using indirect access through the intermediate component, security is achieved without adding complex structural elements to the system
3Reliability
If address hiding and protection mechanisms are implemented, then security of critical assets is improved, but access overhead may increase
Solution Approach 1:
The intermediate component is pre-configured with the necessary access information and validation rules. By preparing access paths and validation mechanisms in advance, the patent enables fast access to protected assets without real-time complex computations, minimizing access time overhead
Data Source
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AI summary
This application provides a data processing method and a data processing apparatus, and relates to the field of communications technologies. The method is applied to a data plane OS of a network device. The data plane OS includes an untrusted component, an intermediate component, and a trusted component. The untrusted component includes an application and a data plane OS kernel. The trusted component includes a trusted computing base and a critical asset component. The critical asset component includes critical data and/or critical code that are/is of the application and the data plane OS kernel and that are/is used to provide a security service. The intermediate component is used for security isolation between the trusted component and the untrusted component. The intermediate component includes a first system instruction. The intermediate component may receive a first request that is sent by the untrusted component and that is used to access the trusted component, execute the first system instruction to obtain a first virtual address from a first system register, and send the first request to the trusted component based on the first virtual address. The trusted component performs processing based on the first request. This helps protect integrity and privacy of data and/or code in the trusted component of the data plane OS.