Database Transparent Encryption Key Management via Vault
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current data encryption methods for databases are vulnerable to attacks as they rely on a single encryption key, lack user authentication, and expose the encryption key when requesting access, making them susceptible to breaches, especially in multi-user organizations where a single administrator key can compromise security.
Innovation Solution
A system and method for managing transparent data encryption using an encrypted vault application that requires multiple administrator keys for unsealing, with an application server providing authorization and access tokens to securely communicate encryption keys to the database, ensuring that no single user can access the encryption key and preventing unauthorized access by never storing or requesting the key directly.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If a single encryption key is used to access the database, then the operation is simple and fast, but the security is compromised as a single key can be stolen or compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The single encryption key is segmented into multiple key shares distributed among different administrators. No single administrator possesses the complete key, and collaboration between multiple administrators is required to reconstruct and use the encryption key, thereby enhancing security while maintaining manageable key distribution
Solution Approach 2:
The system transitions from a single-dimensional key storage model to a multi-dimensional key management architecture involving multiple administrators, key shares, and reconstruction mechanisms. This adds dimensional complexity to key access while distributing security responsibilities across multiple entities
2Ease of operation
If the database requests the encryption key directly, then the key access is straightforward, but attackers can detect and target the database for attacks
Solution Approach 1:
An intermediary component is introduced between the database and the key management system. This intermediary handles key requests on behalf of the database, masking the database's direct need for keys and preventing attackers from detecting which databases require encryption keys, thereby reducing the database's exposure to targeted attacks
3Ease of operation
If the encryption key is stored by the application server, then the key access is convenient, but any attacker compromising the application server or database gains access to the encryption key
Solution Approach 1:
The encryption key is extracted from the application server and database environments where it would be vulnerable to compromise. Instead, the key is managed by a separate key management system that distributes key shares to administrators, ensuring that even if the application server or database is compromised, the encryption key remains secure and inaccessible to attackers
Data Source
AI summary
Disclosed is a system for managing transparent data encryption of a database. The system comprises an encrypted vault application and an application server. The encrypted vault application stores at least one encryption key for the database. The application server is configured to provide an authorization token to the encrypted vault application after unsealing of the encrypted vault application; receive an access token from the encrypted vault application, after authentication of the application server; provide the access token to the encrypted vault application to receive at least one encryption key therefrom; and communicate the at least one encryption key, via a key talker, to the database; and wherein the database comprises a key listener that listens for the at least one encryption key and provides the at least one encryption key to the database.