DDoS Mitigation via Secure Shell Segmentation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current technologies lack an effective protocol for mitigating the impact of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, which compromise website integrity and customer experience by failing to distinguish between trusted and untrusted devices during attacks, leading to service disruptions and dissatisfaction.

Innovation Solution

A system that determines the presence of a unique code or digital certificate on devices accessing a website, allowing trusted devices to maintain access through a secure shell while temporarily allowing untrusted devices access with a time-limited token and disabling access during DDoS attacks.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If access control is implemented to block untrusted devices during DDoS attacks, then service integrity is improved, but user satisfaction deteriorates due to service disruptions

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveservice integrityVSAvoiduser satisfaction
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSEase of operation

Solution Approach 1:

The system segments access control by implementing separate secure shell connections for trusted devices versus standard connections for untrusted devices. This allows differentiated treatment where trusted users maintain access through secure shells while untrusted devices are blocked, resolving the contradiction between service integrity and user satisfaction by preventing attacks from untrusted sources while preserving access for legitimate users

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The secure shell acts as an intermediary layer between the website and users. By requiring secure shell connections for trusted devices, the system creates a protective intermediary that filters malicious traffic while allowing legitimate traffic to pass through, thus maintaining both service integrity and user satisfaction

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If code verification is implemented to distinguish trusted devices, then security against DDoS attacks is improved, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidsystem complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary actions by establishing secure shell connections and verifying device codes before DDoS attacks occur. Trusted devices are pre-authenticated and have their access permissions configured in advance, which simplifies the response during attacks by eliminating the need for complex real-time verification of trusted users while maintaining security

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

3Reliability

If secure shell connections are established for all devices, then access security is improved, but system performance deteriorates due to increased processing overhead

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveaccess securityVSAvoidsystem performance
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSProductivity

Solution Approach 1:

The system applies local quality by implementing secure shell connections selectively only for trusted devices rather than universally. The secure shell protocol is activated locally for authenticated users while untrusted devices are blocked at the connection level, thus maintaining access security for legitimate users while avoiding the performance overhead of applying secure shell encryption to all connections

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

Data Source

PatentUS11677765B1Distributed denial of service attack mitigation
Publication Date: 2023.06.13 WELLS FARGO BANK NA
  • US11677765B1 patent drawing
  • US11677765B1 patent drawing
  • US11677765B1 patent drawing

AI summary

Provided herein are identification of a distributed denial of service attack and automatic implementation of preventive measures to halt the distributed denial of service attack. At substantially the same time as the attack, valid users/customers (e.g., devices) are provided quality of service and continued access to a website experiencing the distributed denial of service attack. Further, service to temporary or unknown users (e.g., devices) with public access to the website is suspended during the duration of the distributed denial of service attack.