Delegate Certificate Chain for Secure Third-Party Access
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing communication systems between clients and servers face challenges in secure authentication and authorization, particularly in distributed systems where task delegation across multiple clients is complex, and existing methods require reliance on certification authorities and cumbersome certificate management.
Innovation Solution
A client device creates a delegate certificate chain bound to a third-party device's public key, including human-readable names and contextual restraints, which is transmitted to the target entity server for authorization, allowing selective sharing of credentials and restraints to manage access rights.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional certificate authorities and full certificate chains are used for authentication, then security and trust are established, but system complexity and computational overhead increase significantly
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the traditional monolithic certificate chain into modular components: delegate certificates, delegate certificate chains, and service-specific credentials. Each component serves a specific authentication purpose and can be independently managed, reducing overall system complexity while maintaining security through structured verification.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces delegate certificates as intermediary authentication objects that mediate between the service and third-party devices. These delegate certificates act as trusted intermediaries that carry authorization information without requiring the service to directly manage complex certificate authorities or full certificate chains, simplifying the authentication architecture.
2Reliability
If complete certificate chains are shared among all clients, then authentication authority is properly established, but information security and privacy are compromised through excessive credential exposure
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by creating service-specific delegate certificates that contain only the authorization information relevant to particular services. Each delegate certificate is tailored with specific credentials and scope limitations appropriate to its intended use, rather than distributing universal full certificate chains, thereby minimizing credential exposure while maintaining authorization validity.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses partial action by sharing only the necessary portion of authentication credentials (delegate certificates with specific scopes) rather than complete certificate chains. This selective sharing provides sufficient authorization information for service access while avoiding the excessive disclosure of unrelated credential information.
3Adaptability or versatility
If third-party devices are granted broad access rights, then service functionality is enhanced, but security risks increase from unauthorized access
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements dynamic access control through delegate certificates that can be created, modified, and revoked as needed. The authorization scope of each delegate certificate is configurable and can be adjusted based on current security requirements, allowing the system to adapt delegation flexibility while maintaining security through dynamic credential management rather than static broad access rights.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent changes the parameters of access control by using delegate certificates with configurable scope, validity period, and authorization levels. These parameterized credentials allow third-party devices to receive tailored access rights that are precisely controlled, enabling service functionality while mitigating security risks through granular parameter management.
Data Source
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AI summary
A client device communicates with a target entity server and one or more third party devices. The client device has a client credential that includes a client public key and a client certificate chain. The client certificate chain includes a chain of human-readable names. The client device delegates a third party device access to a service on the server by creating a delegate certificate chain for the third party device. The delegate certificate chain is bound to a public key for the third party device and includes a human-readable name with an extension selected for the third party device. The delegate certificate chain also may include a section of the human-readable name that identifies the client device. The client device transmits or otherwise presents the delegate certificate chain to the third party device.