Destructive Readout Memory Circuit Authentication
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing authentication processes between electronic circuits are ineffective in distinguishing authentic from non-authentic products, particularly in cases of cloning or emulation attacks, where clone circuits replicate the topography or emulate the operation of authentic circuits, leading to functional clones.
Innovation Solution
The proposed solution involves a method where a first electronic circuit generates a value based on a second value received from another circuit and a third value stored in a destructive readout non-volatile memory, using a derivation function, and applies a one-way function to authenticate, leveraging a set of public and secret values linked by an associative function, with the second circuit selecting values from a predefined set to prevent cloning and emulation attacks.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If conventional authentication protocols are used between electronic circuits, then authentication can be performed, but clone circuits can replicate the topography or emulate the operation of authentic circuits, leading to failed authentication
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication secret is segmented into multiple parts: a static component stored in non-volatile memory and dynamic components generated from random values. Each authentication session uses a different combination of these segments, preventing complete replication even if some segments are compromised.
Solution Approach 2:
The system performs preliminary generation of random values and derivation of secret values before authentication is needed. The destructive readout memory is pre-configured with initial secrets, and the system pre-computes derived secrets that will be used in authentication sessions, ensuring readiness while maintaining security through randomness.
Solution Approach 3:
The system changes authentication parameters dynamically by using different random values for each authentication session. The secret values are derived differently each time based on changing random inputs, making each authentication instance unique and preventing static replication by clone circuits.
2Reliability
If secret values are stored in non-volatile memory for authentication, then authentication can be performed, but the memory can be read and cloned, compromising security
Solution Approach 1:
The system extracts only the necessary authentication proof from the secret values during each session, rather than storing or transmitting the complete secret values. The destructive readout memory stores only essential initial secrets, while derived secrets are generated temporarily and discarded after use.
Solution Approach 2:
The system uses disposable random values and temporary derived secrets that are generated for each authentication session and then discarded. These short-living cryptographic objects replace persistent secret storage, ensuring that even if one session's secrets are compromised, they cannot be reused for future sessions.
3Adaptability or versatility
If multiple secret values are generated for different authentication sessions, then authentication flexibility is improved, but the complexity of managing and securing all secret values increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system merges the management of multiple secret values into a unified process by deriving all session-specific secrets from a single static secret stored in destructive readout memory combined with session-specific random values. This consolidation simplifies management while maintaining the ability to generate unlimited unique authentication sessions.
Solution Approach 2:
The static secret stored in the destructive readout memory serves as a universal base for generating all authentication session secrets. A single secret value enables the system to participate in multiple authentication sessions with different devices, providing universality without requiring separate secrets for each session.
Data Source
AI summary
In authenticating a first circuit by a second circuit, the second circuit selects one of a set of public values and sends to the first circuit a request for a secret value corresponding to the selected one of the set of public values. The first circuit derives the secret value from the selected one of the set of public values using a seed from set of seeds that is stored in a destructive fashion such that each use of a seed destroys that seed. The set of seeds is smaller in number than the set of public values. The second circuit determines whether the secret value matches the selected one of the set of public values using a one-way function. A positive authentication is generated based upon the determination of a match.