Manufacturer Device Certificate Rollover for Crypto-Agile IoT Trust
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing IoT device certificates face security risks due to the potential compromise of post-quantum digital signature algorithms before the end of their 10-20 year lifespan, and there is no clear method for centrally reissuing these certificates without direct access to the devices, especially in industrial environments.
Innovation Solution
A system and method for crypto-agile issuance of manufacturer device certificates using stateful Hash-Based Signature (sHBS) algorithms, where a local certificate is stored on the device, allowing it to independently issue new certificates using a secure manufacturing environment and secure elements, enabling algorithm updates without direct CA involvement.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If current post-quantum digital signature algorithms are used for device certificates, then device security is improved, but the risk of cryptographic compromise increases over the device's 10-20 year lifespan
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements a dynamic certificate system where the manufacturer device certificate can be rolled over to new cryptographic algorithms without device replacement. The system transitions from static certificates to dynamic, upgradable certificates that adapt to evolving cryptographic standards, resolving the contradiction between current security needs and future algorithm obsolescence.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent prepares devices in advance with the infrastructure needed for certificate rollover, including secure storage for multiple certificates and the capability to validate alternative cryptographic algorithms. This preliminary preparation enables future algorithm migrations without compromising device security or requiring physical access to devices deployed in the field.
2Reliability
If device certificates are issued with fixed cryptographic algorithms at manufacturing, then initial security is ensured, but future algorithm updates become impossible without direct CA access to devices
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the certificate system into multiple independent certificates: an initial manufacturer device certificate issued at manufacturing, and a subsequent customer device certificate issued during operation. This segmentation allows the initial certificate to provide guaranteed security at manufacturing while the system evolves to support algorithm updates through the customer-facing certificate, eliminating the need for direct CA access to devices.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary certificate structure where the manufacturer device certificate serves as a trust anchor that can enroll alternative certificates. This intermediary mechanism allows algorithm updates to be propagated through the certificate chain without requiring direct communication between the CA and the end device, resolving the accessibility problem.
3Reliability
If manufacturer device certificates are used for device onboarding, then device authentication is improved, but the risk of certificate compromise increases if cryptography becomes vulnerable
Solution Approach 1:
The patent makes the authentication system dynamic by enabling certificate rollover from the initial manufacturer device certificate to updated certificates using newer cryptographic algorithms. This dynamic capability maintains strong device authentication while systematically reducing cryptographic vulnerability risk as algorithms are updated throughout the device lifecycle without requiring device replacement.
Data Source
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AI summary
System and computer-implemented method for crypto-agile issuance of a manufacturer device certificate (MDCert) to a device (21), the manufacturer device certificate (MDCert) attesting authenticity of the device (21) to a relying party, comprising the steps performed during manufacturing phase of the device (21), - initializing (S1) onto the device, (21) a sHBS private key (HBSsK) and an associated sHBS public key according to a stateful Hash-Based Signature (sHBS) algorithm, - issuing (S2), by a certification authority (20), a local certificate (locCert) certifying the HBS public key (HBSpK) and signing the local certificate (locCert) with a first digital signature algorithm using a private key of the certificate - generating (S4), by the device (21), a manufacturer private key and an associated manufacturer public key according to a second digital signature algorithm, - issuing (S5), by the device (21) to the device (21), the manufacturer device certificate (MDCert) certifying the manufacturer public key and signing the manufacturer device certificate (MDCert) with the HSB signature algorithm using the sHBS private key (HBSsK).