Device-Dependent KH-PRF Authentication for Impersonation Resistance
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing key-homomorphic pseudorandom function (KH-PRF) based cryptographic schemes are vulnerable to impersonation attacks due to their device-independent nature, allowing malicious actors to forge signatures with compromised private keys without needing specific device information.
Innovation Solution
A device-dependent KH-PRF based encryption scheme is introduced, where the unique and evolving characteristics of a device determine the behavior of the signature algorithm, generating time-variable secure signatures that are difficult to forge, leveraging pseudorandom, self-transformative properties and machine learning models to create deterministic error distributions.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If device-independent KH-PRF based cryptographic schemes are used, then ease of operation is improved, but security against impersonation attacks deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by making the cryptographic scheme device-dependent rather than device-independent. Each device has unique characteristics (hardware errors, communication errors, manufacturing variations) that are locally captured and used to generate device-specific secret keys and signatures. This ensures that even if one device's private key is compromised, other devices remain secure due to their unique local qualities.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent changes the parameter of device independence to device dependence by incorporating time-variable device states into the cryptographic protocol. The device state includes hardware errors, communication errors, and other unique characteristics that change over time. This parameter change transforms the static, device-independent KH-PRF into a dynamic, device-dependent authentication mechanism that is resistant to impersonation attacks.
2Reliability
If device-specific characteristics are incorporated into the authentication protocol, then security against impersonation attacks is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies self-service by having each device automatically capture and utilize its own unique characteristics (hardware errors, communication errors, manufacturing variations) without requiring external configuration or calibration. The device independently generates its own device-specific secret key and authentication signatures using its inherent properties, eliminating the need for complex setup procedures or external device identification mechanisms.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent substitutes mechanical or manual device identification systems with an automated error-based authentication mechanism. Instead of using physical device identifiers, serial numbers, or manual configuration, the system automatically captures error patterns from hardware and communication channels and uses these error-based signatures for authentication. This substitution reduces device complexity by eliminating the need for separate device identification infrastructure.
3Ease of operation
If traditional encryption schemes are used, then ease of operation is maintained, but vulnerability to quantum impersonation attacks increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies dynamics by introducing time-variable device states into the authentication protocol. The device state changes over time due to evolving hardware errors, communication errors, and environmental factors. This dynamic characteristic ensures that even quantum computers cannot impersonate a device, as they would need to replicate not just the private key but also the specific time-varying device state, which is infeasible. The dynamic nature maintains ease of operation while providing quantum resistance.
Data Source
AI summary
In one implementation, the disclosure provides systems and methods for generating a secure signature using a device-specific and group-specific moving target authentication protocol. According to one implementation, generating the secure signature entails determining a state of a first device in association with a select time interval. The state of the first device is defined by one or more time-variable characteristics of the first device. The device computes an output for a signing function that depends upon the determined state of the first device associated with the first time interval.