Chip-Specific Device Key Binding via Protected Software Enclave

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing software video encryptors (SVEs) do not provide a way to bind device key sets to specific chips during distribution over a network, due to anonymity requirements, which hinders secure key management.

Innovation Solution

A method involving a protected software environment like Intel SGX Enclave, where a provisioning request is generated with a public key, sent to a quoting enclave for a quote, and then to an online provisioning server for an encrypted device key set, which is decrypted and re-encrypted with a chip-specific key, ensuring secure binding and storage.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If a protected software environment is used to protect device key sets during distribution, then security is improved, but the ability to bind device key sets to specific chips is lost due to anonymity requirements

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidability to bind device key sets to specific chips
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces an intermediary binding mechanism that operates within the protected software environment. This intermediary allows device key sets to be associated with specific chip identifiers without exposing the key sets themselves, thereby maintaining both security and binding capability. The intermediary acts as a trusted mediator that enables the association function while preserving the anonymity properties of the protected environment.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent segments the binding function into separate components: the device key set remains protected within the secure environment, while the chip identification binding is handled through separate attestation mechanisms. This segmentation allows the key sets to maintain their security isolation while still being associated with specific devices through external verification processes.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

2Reliability

If chip-specific binding is implemented in advance, then key management security is improved, but the complexity of the distribution system increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvekey management securityVSAvoiddistribution system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements preliminary binding actions during the device provisioning phase, before actual key distribution occurs. By pre-establishing the association between device key sets and chip identifiers through attestation processes, the system avoids the need for complex runtime binding mechanisms, thereby reducing overall system complexity while maintaining security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The protected software environment performs self-attestation, automatically verifying its own integrity and generating binding information without requiring external verification infrastructure. This self-service capability reduces the complexity of the distribution system by eliminating the need for complex external attestation authorities while still enabling secure chip-specific binding.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Data Source

PatentUS11677548B2Secure distribution of device key sets over a network
Publication Date: 2023.06.13 ARRIS ENTERPRISES LLC
  • US11677548B2 patent drawing
  • US11677548B2 patent drawing
  • US11677548B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A system is provided for distribution of device key sets over a network in a protected software environment (PSE). In the system, a client device includes a connection interface for receiving a crypto hardware (CH) token belonging to a user, untrusted software, a quoting enclave, and a PSE for generating a provisioning request for a device key set. An attestation proxy server (APS) receives the provisioning message using a first network connection, and transmits the provisioning message to an online provisioning server (OPS) using a second network connection. The OPS constructs a provisioning response and an encrypted device key set, and delivers the provisioning response to the untrusted software using the first and second network connections. The PSE decrypts the encrypted device key set to obtain the device key set, re-encrypts the device key set with a local chip-specific key, and stores the re-encrypted device key set.