Device-Level Network Filter for Password Leakage Prevention

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Solution Overview

Problem

Users face challenges in securely managing multiple passwords across various accounts due to phishing and malware threats, with password managers being vulnerable to unauthorized access and transmission.

Innovation Solution

A device-level network filter, integrated with a password manager, detects and prevents unauthorized password transmissions by filtering network traffic at the computing device level without relying on a remote server, using APIs or kernel drivers to identify and validate legitimate password destinations and take security actions against illegitimate attempts.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If password managers are used to store and automatically enter passwords, then ease of operation is improved, but security is worsened due to vulnerability to phishing and malware

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveease of operationVSAvoidsecurity
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

A network filter is introduced as an intermediary component between the password manager and the network. The filter monitors and controls password transmissions, validating destinations against a whitelist of authorized domains. This intermediary layer prevents malware and phishing attacks from stealing passwords while allowing legitimate password managers to function normally.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If device-level network filtering is implemented to prevent password leakage, then security is improved, but device complexity is worsened

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoiddevice complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The network filter is designed to be self-configuring and self-managing. It automatically obtains the whitelist of authorized domains through API calls to the password manager, which provides the domains where passwords should be transmitted. The filter autonomously compares outgoing password traffic against this whitelist and takes appropriate actions without requiring manual configuration or intervention, thereby limiting the increase in device complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Ease of manufacture

If remote servers are used for network filtering, then ease of manufacture is improved, but loss of information is worsened due to potential interception

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveease of manufactureVSAvoidloss of information
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of manufactureVSLoss of information

Solution Approach 1:

The solution transitions from a centralized remote server model to a distributed device-level filtering model. Instead of sending password traffic to a remote server for filtering, the filtering functionality is moved to the local device where passwords are transmitted. This dimensional shift from network-centric to device-centric filtering ensures that passwords never leave the device in plaintext form, eliminating the risk of interception during transmission to remote servers.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #17Another dimension (Dimensionality change)

Data Source

PatentUS11146533B1Detecting and preventing password leakage using a device-level network filter
Publication Date: 2021.10.12 GEN DIGITAL INC
  • US11146533B1 patent drawing
  • US11146533B1 patent drawing
  • US11146533B1 patent drawing

AI summary

A user name, password and associated domain are stored for each account managed by a password manager on a computing device. A device-level network extension filters network traffic. Passwords are identified in outbound network traffic. Target domains to which identified passwords are being transmitted are compared to stored domains associated with the identified passwords. Based on results of these comparisons, it is determined whether attempts to transmit passwords to target domains are legitimate or not. In response to determining that a specific attempt to transmit a password to a target domain is legitimate, the transmission is allowed to proceed. Responsive to determining that a given attempt to transmit a password to a target domain is not legitimate, a corresponding security action is taken. For example, the connection over which the non-legitimate password transmission attempt is being made can be terminated, or the transmission attempt can be blocked.