User Authentication Via Device-Mediated SMS Against SIM Swap Attacks
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing two-factor and multi-factor authentication methods, such as SMS-based OTP verification, are vulnerable to security risks like SIM swap attacks and interception of OTP codes, compromising user identity verification in online services.
Innovation Solution
A server-based system that calculates signatures using a shared secret key, verifies mobile-originated SMS messages within a time frame, and performs Home Location Register lookups to authenticate user access attempts, reducing fraud potential.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If SMS-based OTP verification is used for two-factor authentication, then user identity verification capability is improved, but security against SIM swap attacks and OTP interception is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces an intermediary verification process where the system sends a call-to-action message to the user's device, which then automatically generates and sends an SMS back to the system. This intermediary step prevents direct OTP transmission vulnerabilities by using the user's own device as a trusted mediator that proves possession without exposing the OTP to external interception or SIM swap attacks.
Solution Approach 2:
Instead of the traditional flow where the system sends OTP to the user and the user inputs it back, the patent inverts the process: the system provides a call-to-action, the user's device automatically generates the verification code, and sends it back to the system. This reversal eliminates the need for secure OTP transmission channels while maintaining verification integrity.
2Ease of operation
If traditional OTP transmission methods are used, then authentication process simplicity is improved, but security against man-in-the-middle attacks is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The user's own device acts as a trusted intermediary that generates and transmits the verification code directly to the system through a controlled channel. This eliminates the vulnerability to man-in-the-middle attacks because the code is generated on the user's device rather than being transmitted from the system, making interception ineffective.
Solution Approach 2:
The user's device autonomously generates the verification code and sends it to the system without requiring manual OTP input or exposure to external communication channels. This self-service approach maintains simplicity while enhancing security by removing the system from the OTP transmission path.
3Adaptability or versatility
If email-based OTP verification is used, then alternative authentication channel is improved, but security against email account compromise is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies the intermediary principle across all authentication channels. Instead of sending OTP through potentially compromised channels (SMS, email), the system provides a call-to-action that triggers the user's device to generate and send the verification code through a secure, device-controlled channel, eliminating channel-specific vulnerabilities.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces the mechanical OTP transmission system (relying on secure communication channels) with an automated device-based system where the user's device generates and transmits the code autonomously. This substitution eliminates reliance on vulnerable communication infrastructure while maintaining authentication flexibility.
Data Source
AI summary
A method, apparatus, system, and non-transitory computer readable medium for performing user verification and authentication may include receiving a network request from a client device associated with an online service in response to a user access attempt of the online service associated with a user, the network request including message recipient information for a mobile-terminated (MT) short message service (SMS) message and a unique one-time password or pin (OTP) code associated with the user, calculating at least one first signature based on the network request and a shared secret key, the shared secret key shared with the client device, the at least one first signature associated with the user, transmitting a network response to the client device, the network response causing the client device to transmit a call-to-action (CTA) message to at least one user device associated with the user, and determining a status of the user access attempt.


