Digital Signature Session Flow Using Split Cryptographic Terms
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Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional cryptographic signature schemes are vulnerable to ROS attacks, which exploit concurrent signature sessions to forge signatures, and existing solutions either introduce new primitives, consume excessive resources, or increase latency, failing to provide secure and effective digital signatures.
Innovation Solution
The cryptographic term is split into an initial and remainder portion, with the remainder portion kept secure and only the initial portion sent initially, allowing recovery at a later stage, thereby thwarting ROS attacks without additional overhead.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If conventional cryptographic signature schemes are used, then digital signature functionality is provided, but the system becomes vulnerable to ROS attacks that exploit concurrent signature sessions
Solution Approach 1:
The first cryptographic term is divided into two distinct parts: an initial portion that is sent to the user and a remainder portion that is retained securely. This segmentation prevents the user from obtaining the complete cryptographic term, thereby blocking ROS attacks that require full access to concurrent signature terms while maintaining the functionality of the digital signature scheme
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary mechanism where the server acts as a mediator that holds and manages the remainder portion of the first cryptographic term. This intermediary approach allows the system to provide digital signature functionality while preventing direct access to complete cryptographic terms that would enable ROS attacks
2Reliability
If existing solutions to overcome ROS attacks are implemented, then security is improved, but new primitives are introduced or resources are consumed excessively
Solution Approach 1:
The patent modifies the existing cryptographic protocol dynamically by selectively revealing only portions of cryptographic terms at different stages of the interaction. This dynamic approach provides security against ROS attacks without requiring fundamentally new cryptographic primitives, instead adapting the information flow in existing protocols
Solution Approach 2:
The invention changes the parameter of information completeness by providing incomplete cryptographic terms (missing the remainder portion) to the user. This parameter change alone, without introducing new primitives, is sufficient to prevent ROS attacks while maintaining compatibility with existing digital signature schemes
3Adaptability or versatility
If complete cryptographic values are exposed to users, then protocol compatibility is maintained, but security is compromised to ROS attacks
Solution Approach 1:
Instead of providing the complete cryptographic term (excessive action that enables attacks), the patent provides only a partial cryptographic term (the initial portion). This partial action is sufficient to maintain protocol compatibility and functionality while being just enough to prevent ROS attacks by missing the critical remainder portion
Data Source
AI summary
A computer-implemented method, according to one approach, includes: computing a first cryptographic term in response to receiving a session request from a user. The first cryptographic term is split into an initial portion and a remainder portion, where the remainder portion includes at least one bit. The initial portion of the first cryptographic term is sent to the user, and two or more different potential second cryptographic terms are received from the user. The at least one bit in the remainder portion is used to determine a correct one of the potential second cryptographic terms. Moreover, the correct one of the potential second cryptographic terms is used to compute a third cryptographic term. Furthermore, the third cryptographic term is sent to the user.