Disaster Roaming Registration Retry Control for Fake Network Rejection
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing methods fail to distinguish between genuine and fake networks when receiving a 5GMM reject cause value #80 during disaster roaming, leading to unnecessary service interruption and failed registration attempts for users in disaster conditions.
Innovation Solution
A method and UE implementation to handle non-integrity protected messages by maintaining a count of attempts, starting a timer, and performing PLMN selection to determine if the reject cause is from a genuine or fake network, allowing or blocking further registration attempts based on integrity checks.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the UE receives a 5GMM reject cause value #80 without integrity protection during disaster roaming, then the UE cannot distinguish whether the message is from a genuine or fake network, but continuing registration attempts leads to unnecessary service interruption and wasted time
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by implementing integrity protection checks on NAS messages before processing registration requests. The network performs integrity verification on the 5GMM reject cause value #80 message in advance, allowing the UE to identify fake networks immediately without attempting registration, thus preventing time loss while maintaining service availability on genuine networks
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements feedback by having the network provide integrity protection information along with the 5GMM reject cause value #80 message. This feedback mechanism allows the UE to receive additional verification data that enables it to distinguish genuine networks from fake ones, resolving the contradiction between service availability and time loss
2Reliability
If the UE blocks further registration attempts after receiving a non-integrity protected reject message, then unnecessary service attempts on fake networks are prevented, but legitimate services on genuine networks may be blocked incorrectly
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies parameter changes by modifying the message structure to include integrity protection indicators. By changing the parameter of message authentication from unprotected to protected status, the system enables accurate distinction between genuine and fake networks, allowing reliable blocking decisions that prevent false positives while maintaining accessibility to legitimate services
3Measurement precision
If the UE performs multiple registration attempts to verify network authenticity, then the ability to identify fake networks improves, but the complexity of the procedure increases and service setup time is extended
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies the taking out principle by extracting the authentication verification step from the multi-attempt registration procedure. The integrity protection information is extracted and provided in the initial message exchange, allowing the UE to perform single-step verification instead of multiple registration attempts, thereby reducing procedure complexity while maintaining detection accuracy
Data Source
AI summary
The disclosure relates to a 5G or 6G communication system for supporting a higher data transmission rate. Embodiments herein provide methods for handling disaster roaming service in network by UE. The method includes determining whether the UE receives a NAS message without integrity protection from a combination of first PLMN and second PLMN upon sending a registration request message to combination of first PLMN and second PLMN after expiry of a timer. In an embodiment, the method includes determining a count of attempt to combination of first PLMN and second PLMN meets a predefined threshold and determining that first PLMN is genuine network in which UE is not allowed to get disaster roaming service and blocking to retry on combination of first PLMN and second PLMN in response to receiving NAS message without integrity protection from combination of first PLMN and second PLMN upon sending a registration request message to the combination of first PLMN and second PLMN after expiry of timer.