Distance-Bounding Protocol Using Modified Secret for Fraud Prevention
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing distance-bounding protocols are vulnerable to various frauds such as distance fraud, mafia fraud, terrorist fraud, and impersonation fraud, and most protocols require a high number of rounds or data exchange to maintain security, making them inefficient.
Innovation Solution
A new distance-bounding protocol that involves an initialization phase where a prover and verifier exchange nonces and a leak function, allowing the prover to compute a modified secret, which is then used to respond to challenges, with a verification phase to ensure the challenges are valid, reducing the number of rounds and data required while maintaining security.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If existing distance-bounding protocols are used to ensure security against frauds, then security is improved, but the number of rounds and data exchange required increases
Solution Approach 1:
The protocol divides the authentication process into two distinct phases: an initialization phase where the verifier sends challenge messages and the prover computes responses, and a verification phase where the verifier checks the responses. This segmentation allows the protocol to establish security through a limited number of rounds while maintaining efficiency, as the initialization phase prepares necessary cryptographic material beforehand.
Solution Approach 2:
The initialization phase performs preliminary actions by having the verifier send challenge messages and the prover pre-compute responses before the actual verification. This preliminary computation reduces the burden during the verification phase, allowing the protocol to achieve security with fewer total rounds of communication.
2Reliability
If more rounds of communication are used to prevent fraud, then security is improved, but protocol efficiency deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
By segmenting the protocol into initialization and verification phases, the invention achieves security with a limited number of communication rounds. The initialization phase establishes cryptographic context efficiently, and the verification phase completes authentication with minimal additional communication, thereby maintaining high protocol efficiency while ensuring security against various frauds.
Solution Approach 2:
The protocol employs parameter changes in the challenge-response mechanism, where the verifier sends challenge messages with specific parameters and the prover computes responses based on these parameters. This approach allows the protocol to achieve security with optimized parameter selection, reducing the number of required rounds while maintaining strong security properties.
3Reliability
If a high number of challenge-response rounds are used, then security against terrorist fraud is improved, but the complexity of the protocol increases
Solution Approach 1:
The protocol segments the authentication process into initialization and verification phases, which simplifies the overall structure while maintaining security. The initialization phase handles the complex cryptographic setup, and the verification phase performs simpler challenge-response verification, thereby reducing the complexity burden on each individual phase while achieving security against terrorist fraud.
Solution Approach 2:
The initialization phase performs preliminary cryptographic actions that simplify subsequent verification operations. By pre-establishing the necessary cryptographic context and parameters, the protocol reduces the complexity of the verification phase, making the overall protocol more manageable while maintaining strong security against terrorist fraud.
Data Source
AI summary
The invention is related to a method allowing a prover holding a secret key (x) to prove its identity to a verifier and to prove to this verifier that he is within a predetermined distance of this verifier, said method comprising an initialization phase during which:the prover picks a first nonce (Np) and communicates this first nonce to the verifier;the verifier picks a first random vector (a), a leak function (Lμ), and a second nonce (Nv);the verifier uses said leak function (Lμ) to compute a modified secret (x′) depending on the leak (Lμ(x)) of said secret;the verifier transmits to said prover said leak function and said second nonce;the prover retrieves said first random vector and said modified secret,wherein said first random vector and said modified secret are used by said prover for computing responses (ri) to challenges (ci).