Distributed Two-Person Access Control With IP and Payload Validation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Geographically dispersed two-person control in computer access control systems faces challenges due to latency, network reliability issues, and security vulnerabilities, particularly in zero-trust architectures, where malicious actors can intercept and alter communication, compromising authentication and access control.
Innovation Solution
A distributed computing system with a user and control system that utilize IP address and payload labels (CIPSO DOI) to authenticate and authorize actions, ensuring secure two-party access by verifying expected IP addresses and payloads, using zero-trust network access (ZTNA) and security-enhanced Linux (SELinux) for mandatory access control.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If two-factor authentication is implemented for geographically dispersed users, then security is improved, but latency and network reliability issues worsen
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary authentication of the initiate message sender against an expected IP address and payload before processing the two-factor authentication. This preliminary validation ensures that only authorized initiators can trigger the authentication process, reducing unnecessary latency from rejections of unauthorized attempts while maintaining security.
Solution Approach 2:
The remote system acts as an intermediary that validates message authenticity using CIPSO DOI labels and expected IP addresses before forwarding authentication requests. This intermediary layer filters out unauthorized communications early, reducing network latency and improving reliability by preventing malformed requests from proceeding through the authentication workflow.
2Ease of operation
If communication channels are opened for geographically distributed two-person control, then accessibility is improved, but security vulnerabilities worsen due to interception risks
Solution Approach 1:
The system uses CIPSO DOI labels as unique identifiers that change or vary for each communication session and participant. These labels act as digital fingerprints that authenticate the identity of communicating parties, allowing the system to distinguish authorized communications from intercepted or malicious ones while maintaining ease of operation for legitimate users.
Solution Approach 2:
The system preemptively validates the initiator's IP address and payload against expected values before processing any control messages. This preliminary anti-action prevents intercepted or malicious messages from being processed, countering potential security threats before they can compromise the system while allowing legitimate geographically distributed operations to proceed smoothly.
3Reliability
If IP address and payload validation is implemented, then authorization integrity is improved, but device complexity worsens
Solution Approach 1:
The system implements partial validation by checking only critical fields (IP address and CIPSO DOI label) against expected values rather than performing exhaustive verification of all message components. This selective approach maintains authorization integrity for the most important security parameters while avoiding the complexity overhead of validating every possible message attribute.
Data Source
AI summary
Two party computer access control including a network interface for receiving, an initiate message including a first label, a first payload and a first internet protocol address and for receiving a control message including a second label, a second payload and a second internet protocol address, and a processor for executing the action in response to the first label corresponding to the action, the first internet protocol address corresponding to an expected internet protocol address of the first user system, the first payload corresponding to a first expected payload associated with the requested action, the second label corresponding to the action, the second internet protocol address corresponding to an expected internet protocol address of the second system, and the second payload corresponding to a first expected payload associated with the action.