Decryption Key Recovery via Distributed Attribute and Location Proofs
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing public-key cryptography systems are vulnerable to security breaches when trusted components within an organization are compromised, allowing malicious entities to access sensitive data and computing resources.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a zero-trust model with location attribute policy servers that verify user attributes and location using cryptographic proofs to recover decryption keys, ensuring that decryption keys are not stored on untrusted components, thereby preventing unauthorized access.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If decryption keys are stored on trusted components within an organization, then access to encrypted resources can be granted conveniently, but security is compromised when those trusted components are breached
Solution Approach 1:
The decryption key is divided into multiple portions and distributed across different location attribute policy servers. Each server holds only a fragment of the key, and no single server has complete access. This segmentation ensures that even if one server is compromised, the attacker cannot retrieve the full decryption key, thereby maintaining security while enabling distributed key management.
Solution Approach 2:
Location attribute policy servers act as intermediaries between users and encrypted resources. These servers verify user attributes and location through cryptographic proofs before releasing key portions. The intermediaries enforce access policies without storing complete decryption keys, balancing security requirements with convenient access control.
2Reliability
If decryption keys are distributed across multiple servers, then security is improved against breaches, but system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
Location attribute policy servers perform multiple functions: they store key portions, verify user attributes, validate location information, and release key portions when policies are satisfied. This multi-functionality reduces the need for separate dedicated components for each task, thereby managing system complexity while maintaining security through distributed key management.
Solution Approach 2:
The system uses cryptographic parameters and proofs to automate the verification and key release process. By changing from manual access control to automated cryptographic verification, the system manages complexity through standardized protocols while achieving high security through distributed key management.
3Reliability
If cryptographic proofs are required for attribute verification, then access control security is enhanced, but processing time and computational resources increase
Solution Approach 1:
User attributes and location information are verified through cryptographic proofs before any decryption key portions are released. This preliminary verification ensures that only authorized users accessing from valid locations can obtain key portions, enhancing security. The computational overhead is incurred upfront during the verification phase, enabling secure access control.
4Reliability
If complete decryption keys are not stored on untrusted components, then security against malicious access is improved, but key management complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The decryption key is segmented into multiple portions distributed across different location attribute policy servers. No single untrusted component stores the complete key, preventing malicious access even if individual servers are compromised. This segmentation strategy manages key management complexity through distributed storage while maintaining high security standards.
Data Source
AI summary
A decryption key is recovered that is utilized to decrypt an encrypted resource. One or more location attribute policy (LAP) servers determine whether a user attempting to access a resource has the necessary attributes to access the resource and is in a valid location in which the user is required to be to access the resource. The attributes and location are defined by a policy assigned to the resource. To verify that the user has the required attributes, the LAP server(s) request a cryptographic proof from the user that proves that the user has the required attributes. Upon validating the proof, a first portion of the decryption key is released. The LAP server(s) release a second portion of the decryption key after verifying that the user is in the required location. The LAP server(s) generate the decryption key based on the released portions.