Distributed Encryption Key Reconstruction via Anonymous Ledger

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Solution Overview

Problem

Conventional encryption management systems are vulnerable to unauthorized key reconstruction due to key managers knowing each other's identities, leading to potential collusion and unauthorized access to sensitive data.

Innovation Solution

An encryption management system that generates requests for secret shares anonymously, using certificates that do not reveal the device's identity, and utilizes a distributed ledger for secure communication and key reconstruction, ensuring that key managers remain anonymous and cannot collude.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If key managers know each other's identities in conventional encryption systems, then key reconstruction can be facilitated through direct communication, but the system becomes vulnerable to collusion and unauthorized access

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvekey reconstruction processVSAvoidcollusion vulnerability
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a distributed ledger as an intermediary that enables key managers to communicate and coordinate key reconstruction without directly revealing their identities to each other. The ledger acts as a neutral mediator that facilitates the process while maintaining anonymity, thus enabling ease of operation while preventing collusion vulnerability.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent changes the parameter of identity visibility from 'visible' to 'hidden' by implementing anonymous communication protocols. Key managers interact through pseudonyms or encrypted identifiers on the distributed ledger, transforming the system from one where identities are known to one where they remain concealed, thereby preventing collusion while maintaining operational capability.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

2Reliability

If device identities are revealed in secret share requests, then authentication can be verified, but the device becomes vulnerable to coercion and theft attempts

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauthentication validityVSAvoidcoercion vulnerability
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The distributed ledger serves as an intermediary that verifies authentication without exposing device identities. Requests are signed with certificates that prove validity without revealing the underlying device identity, allowing the system to maintain reliability through verification while protecting against coercion by keeping identities hidden.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent extracts the identity information from the authentication request, separating the verification function from the identity revelation. Certificates provide proof of authenticity without containing or exposing the device's real identity, thus extracting the harmful element (identity exposure) while retaining the useful function (authentication verification).

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Data Source

PatentUS12206768B2Distributed anonymized compliant encryption management system
Publication Date: 2025.01.21 NAGRAVISION SRL
  • US12206768B2 patent drawing
  • US12206768B2 patent drawing
  • US12206768B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A method for data security implemented as an application on a device includes generating a request for one or more secret shares needed to reconstruct a key. The device stores a first secret share in its memory. The method also includes signing the request with a certificate that identifies the request as valid without identifying the device, and sending the request, signed with the certificate, to at least one other device. The method further includes receiving, from the at least one other device, the one or more secret shares, determining whether the one or more secret shares received from the at least one other device is sufficient to reconstruct the key, and reconstructing the key using the first secret share and the one or more secret shares upon determining that the one or more secret shares are sufficient to reconstruct the key.