Distributed HSM Key Isolation to Cut Latency and Exposure Risk

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Solution Overview

Problem

Centralized security modules in cloud and enterprise networks face inefficiencies due to network latency and resource intensity, and the risk of key exposure in virtualized environments, which can be exploited by malicious entities.

Innovation Solution

Implementing a distributed hardware security module (HSM) that is physically separate from the host processor, storing cryptographic keys in a secure data store and performing operations on behalf of the host system without exposing the keys, while enforcing platform integrity and attestation policies.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Device complexity

If a centralized security module is used to store and manage cryptographic keys, then key management is simplified and centralized control is achieved, but network latency increases and resource intensity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvekey management complexityVSAvoidnetwork latency
Core Design Contradiction:
Device complexityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The system segments the centralized security module into multiple distributed HSMs deployed across different locations. Each HSM independently manages cryptographic operations for its associated host processor, eliminating the single point of congestion and reducing network latency while maintaining centralized security through distributed architecture.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

2Device complexity

If a centralized security module is used to store cryptographic keys, then centralized control is achieved, but the risk of key exposure increases in virtualized environments

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecentralized controlVSAvoidkey exposure risk
Core Design Contradiction:
Device complexityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The system extracts the key storage function from the virtualized host environment and places it in dedicated hardware security modules with physical separation. The HSMs store cryptographic keys in secure hardware compartments that are isolated from the virtualized host memory and processing units, preventing key exposure through virtualization vulnerabilities.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The HSM acts as an intermediary between the virtualized host and the cryptographic operations. Instead of storing keys directly in the host memory where they could be exposed, the HSM mediates all cryptographic operations, providing a secure boundary that protects keys while enabling the virtualized environment to perform security functions.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

3Ease of operation

If cryptographic keys are released into the user's virtualized environment, then key accessibility is improved, but security is reduced due to potential exploitation by malicious entities

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvekey accessibilityVSAvoidsecurity
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary key wrapping encryption before storing keys in the HSM. Each cryptographic key is encrypted with a unique wrapping key that is itself encrypted with the host processor's public key. This preliminary encryption ensures that even if keys are accessed, they cannot be used without the proper decryption keys, maintaining security while enabling controlled accessibility.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS20260081760A1Secure key utilization in a distributed hardware security module
Publication Date: 2026.03.19 MICROSOFT TECHNOLOGY LICENSING LLC
  • US20260081760A1 patent drawing
  • US20260081760A1 patent drawing
  • US20260081760A1 patent drawing

AI summary

Systems, methods, and computer readable storage media described herein for secure key utilization in a distributed hardware security module. In an aspect, a hardware security module is communicatively coupled to and physically separate from a host processor. The hardware security module comprises a security coprocessor. The security coprocessor receives, over a network and from a central security module, a first cryptographic key. The first cryptographic key is stored in a secure data store. A request to perform a cryptographic operation is received from the first host processor. The security coprocessor utilizes the first cryptographic key to perform the cryptographic operation, resulting in a cryptographic result. In one aspect, the cryptographic result to the first host processor. In another aspect, the cryptographic result is written to host memory. In another aspect, the hardware security module notifies the host processor that the cryptographic operation was completed.