Distributed Key Management via Segmented Contributions
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Solution Overview
Problem
In distributed computing environments, key-management processes are vulnerable to subversion by adversaries, particularly in public, group, virtualized, or network-accessible settings, where security concerns are heightened due to shared resources and the risk of malicious attacks.
Innovation Solution
A method and device for securing keys by repetitively computing secure-key contributions across multiple computing resources, ensuring that the secure key is truly random and never revealed to any resource, thereby preventing subversion, even in malicious models where attackers can modify implementations.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Adaptability or versatility
If keys are stored in distributed computing resources, then accessibility and utility of shared resources are improved, but security and risk of key leakage are worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The secure key is segmented into multiple secure-key contributions distributed across different computing resources. Each contribution alone is insufficient to reconstruct the key, providing security while enabling distributed access. The key material is divided and stored in different locations, so that compromise of one resource does not expose the entire key.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements nested encryption layers where a master key encrypts data keys, and data keys encrypt actual data. Additionally, secure-key contributions are nested within encrypted containers that require specific decryption sequences. This multi-layered nesting provides defense in depth while maintaining distributed accessibility.
2Ease of operation
If key-management processes are centralized for better control, then security management is improved, but vulnerability to single-point failure and subversion is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
Control over key-management is segmented across multiple computing resources rather than centralized in one location. Each resource holds a portion of the key material and can independently contribute to key reconstruction when needed. This distributed control eliminates single-point failure while maintaining operational control through coordinated access protocols.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent merges multiple secure-key contributions from different computing resources to reconstruct the complete secure key when needed for encryption or decryption operations. This combining mechanism enables centralized functionality (key reconstruction) while maintaining distributed storage, thus achieving both control and security.
3Reliability
If more computing resources are used to store key contributions, then security against subversion is improved, but system complexity and computational overhead are worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The key material is segmented into N contributions distributed across N computing resources. The system is designed to tolerate up to N-1 compromises, providing security that scales with the number of resources. While complexity increases linearly with N, the modular structure allows for standardized implementations that mitigate operational complexity.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent allows dynamic adjustment of the number of computing resources (N) and the threshold for key reconstruction. This parameter flexibility enables optimization of the security-complexity tradeoff based on specific deployment requirements, allowing systems to scale security requirements without rigid structural changes.
Data Source
AI summary
The present invention discloses methods and devices for securing keys when key-management processes are subverted by an adversary. Methods include the steps of: upon receiving a creation request in the computing-environment, creating a secure key in at least one location in a computing environment by repetitively computing respective secure-key contributions: in at least one location; and in a set of N computing resources in the computing environment, wherein N is a non-negative integer; and applying the respective secure-key contributions to change a secure-key value, wherein: the respective secure-key contributions cannot be omitted or modified by at least one location; and the secure key is never revealed to the computing resources; thereby enabling the computing resources in the computing environment to ensure that the secure key is truly random; wherein at least one location is a region of memory located in a computing resource operationally connected to the computing-environment.