Distributed Secret Management with Encrypted TPM-Failure Backups
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing systems face challenges in securely backing up and recovering secrets used by endpoint devices, particularly when Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) become inoperable, leading to potential data loss and compromised security.
Innovation Solution
A method involving the generation of encrypted secret backups, managed through an orchestrator, with separate decryption keys stored securely, allowing for recovery and re-encryption to ensure access to secrets is maintained even when TPMs fail.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If secrets are stored only in endpoint devices with TPMs, then security is maintained, but data loss occurs when TPMs become inoperable
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary action by creating encrypted backups of secrets and storing them in secure locations before TPM failure occurs. The orchestrator extracts secrets from endpoint devices and stores encrypted copies in secure storage systems, ensuring recovery capability is established in advance.
Solution Approach 2:
The orchestrator acts as an intermediary between endpoint devices and secure storage systems. It manages the extraction, encryption, and storage of secrets, and coordinates the recovery process by retrieving encrypted backups and facilitating secret restoration when TPMs become inoperable.
2Reliability
If encrypted secret backups are created and stored separately, then recovery capability is improved, but system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The orchestrator serves multiple functions: it manages secret extraction from endpoint devices, handles encryption using stored symmetric keys, coordinates backup storage, and facilitates recovery processes. This multi-functionality consolidates complexity into a single centralized component rather than distributing it across multiple systems.
Solution Approach 2:
The system uses symmetric keys that are already retained in secure storage systems for encryption operations. The same secure storage infrastructure that protects the symmetric keys also stores the encrypted secret backups, eliminating the need for separate key management systems and reducing overall complexity.
3Object-affected harmful factors
If decryption keys are stored securely separately from encrypted secrets, then security is improved, but access complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The orchestrator acts as a mediator that manages access to both encrypted secrets and their corresponding symmetric keys. It retrieves the appropriate symmetric key from secure storage, uses it to decrypt the secret, and then manages the restoration process, simplifying the operational complexity of secure access.
Solution Approach 2:
The system merges the management of symmetric keys and encrypted secrets under the orchestration of a single centralized component. While the symmetric keys remain stored securely in existing infrastructure, the orchestrator combines key retrieval, decryption, and secret restoration operations into a unified process that simplifies access management.
Data Source
AI summary
Methods and systems for managing secrets are disclosed. To manage secrets, backups of the secrets may be obtained to facilitate future recoveries of the secrets. The backups may be established by a manufacturer of a device. When ownership in the device is transferred to a new owner, the backups of the secrets may be added to an ownership used to complete onboarding of the device to systems managed by the new owner. The new owner may use the backups, in conjunction with decryption keys, to access and use the secrets in the event of the secrets becoming inaccessible.