Distributed Trusted Execution Environment Termination via Confirmation Messages

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Solution Overview

Problem

In a system of connected accelerator subsystems, terminating a distributed trusted execution environment (TEE) poses security risks if not done properly, as malicious code can inject and read confidential data from unencrypted traffic between accelerators.

Innovation Solution

Each accelerator subsystem includes a root of trust with processing circuitry that erases workload and results data from memory, sends confirmation messages, and only terminates the TEE after verifying data erasure across connected subsystems, ensuring data confidentiality through encryption and authentication.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Productivity

If the TEE is terminated on one accelerator without being terminated on connected accelerators, then the processing can be reset faster, but security is compromised as malicious code can read confidential data from unencrypted traffic

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvereset speedVSAvoidsecurity
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by requiring all connected accelerators to terminate their TEEs and erase confidential data before any accelerator is reset. The root of trust coordinates termination across the distributed system, ensuring that data erasure is completed on all accelerators before resetting begins, thus preventing security breaches during the transition state

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent implements feedback through confirmation messages exchanged between roots of trust and the host system. Each root of trust sends a confirmation message indicating that data erasure has been completed on its accelerator, and the host system waits to receive all confirmation messages before allowing resets to proceed, ensuring security is maintained

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

2Reliability

If confirmation messages are exchanged between roots of trust to verify data erasure, then security is improved, but the termination process becomes more complex

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidtermination process complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The host system acts as an intermediary that coordinates the termination process across multiple accelerators. It collects confirmation messages from all roots of trust, verifies that data erasure is complete on all connected accelerators, and then signals when it is safe to proceed with resets, simplifying the overall coordination complexity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent segments the termination process into distinct phases: first, all accelerators erase their confidential data; second, roots of trust send confirmation messages; third, the host system verifies all confirmations; and fourth, accelerators are reset. This segmentation makes the complex distributed termination process manageable and verifiable

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Data Source

PatentUS11651090B2Terminating distributed trusted execution environment via confirmation messages
Publication Date: 2023.05.16 GRAPHCORE LTD
  • US11651090B2 patent drawing
  • US11651090B2 patent drawing
  • US11651090B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A method for securely terminating a distributed trusted execution environment (TEE) spanning a plurality of work accelerators. After wiping sensitive data from the memory of its accelerator, a root of trust for each accelerator is configured to receive confirmation that the data has been wiped from the processor memory in relevant other accelerators prior to moving on to the next stage at which the TEE on its associated accelerator is terminated. Since the data has been wiped from the other accelerators, even if a third party were to inject malicious code into the accelerator, they would be unable to read out the secret data from the other accelerators since the data has been wiped from those other accelerators. In this way, a mechanism is provided for ensuring that when the distributed TEE is terminated, malicious third parties are unable to read out confidential data from the accelerators.