Recursive DNS Attack Detection via Traffic Baseline Analysis

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing cybersecurity solutions are ineffective in detecting and mitigating recursive DNS attacks, which exploit recursive DNS resolvers to overwhelm authoritative DNS servers, causing denial-of-service for legitimate users.

Innovation Solution

A method and system for detecting and mitigating recursive DNS attacks by learning baseline rates and invariants of DNS features, monitoring DNS traffic, analyzing anomalies using detection functions, and performing mitigation actions such as filtering out malicious queries.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If recursive DNS resolvers process all incoming DNS queries, then legitimate users can resolve domain names, but the resolvers become vulnerable to overload from malicious query floods

Engineering Contradiction:
ImproveDNS resolution service availabilityVSAvoidResolver stability under attack
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary learning of normal DNS traffic patterns and establishes baseline rates and invariants before the attack occurs. This pre-established knowledge enables the detection system to quickly identify anomalies during an attack without needing to process and analyze each query in real-time, allowing the resolver to maintain service availability while filtering malicious traffic

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces an intermediary detection system that sits between the DNS resolver and the incoming traffic. This intermediary analyzes queries against learned baselines and filters out malicious traffic before it reaches the resolver, protecting the resolver from overload while allowing legitimate queries to pass through unchanged

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If black lists are used to block known malicious domain names, then some attacks can be prevented, but the solution is not comprehensive and can be easily exploited

Engineering Contradiction:
ImproveAttack prevention capabilityVSAvoidDefense coverage against new attacks
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

Instead of relying on static black lists of domain names, the system changes the detection parameters to include baseline rates of queries, responses, and cache hits, as well as invariants like the ratio of queries to cache hits. These parameter-based detection criteria enable the system to identify malicious traffic patterns regardless of the specific domain names involved, providing comprehensive coverage against both known and novel attacks

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Solution Approach 2:

The detection system automatically learns and updates its own detection criteria by continuously monitoring DNS traffic patterns and refining its understanding of normal versus abnormal behavior. This self-learning capability eliminates the need for manual black list maintenance and enables automatic adaptation to new attack patterns without human intervention

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Measurement precision

If rate-based detection is used to identify flood attacks, then high-volume attacks can be detected, but recursive DNS attacks with normal rates are not detected

Engineering Contradiction:
ImproveFlood attack detection accuracyVSAvoidDetection coverage across attack types
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The system transitions from single-dimensional rate-based detection to multi-dimensional analysis by incorporating multiple detection criteria simultaneously: baseline query rates, response rates, cache hit rates, and their interrelationships. This dimensional expansion allows the system to detect attacks that maintain normal overall rates but exhibit abnormal patterns in specific dimensions, such as unusually high query volumes for non-cached domains

Inventive Principle:
Principle #17Another dimension (Dimensionality change)

4Measurement precision

If manual intervention is used to distinguish attack queries from legitimate queries, then accurate detection is possible, but the process is not automated and requires human expertise

Engineering Contradiction:
ImproveQuery classification accuracyVSAvoidDetection system automation level
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSExtent of automation

Solution Approach 1:

The detection system automatically learns normal traffic patterns and establishes baseline metrics without human intervention. It then uses these baselines to automatically detect and respond to attacks in real-time, eliminating the need for manual query analysis while maintaining high detection accuracy through continuous automated monitoring and adaptation

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Data Source

PatentUS12238125B2Detection and mitigation of recursive domain name system attacks
Publication Date: 2025.02.25 RADWARE LTD
  • US12238125B2 patent drawing
  • US12238125B2 patent drawing
  • US12238125B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A method and system for detecting domain name system (DNS) recursive cyber-attacks are presented. The system includes learning a plurality of baselines of at least rates and rate invariants of DNS features; monitoring DNS traffic directed to and from a DNS resolver, wherein the DNS resolver is communicatively connected between at least one client and at least one name server; analyzing the monitored DNS traffic using at least one detection function to detect an anomaly based in part on at least one baseline of the plurality of learnt baselines; and upon detection of at least one anomaly, performing at least one mitigation action to filter out incoming DNS queries to a domain name under attack.