Windows Driver Handle Monitoring for BYOVD Attack Detection

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing Windows-based systems are vulnerable to Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks, where legitimate but vulnerable drivers are exploited by threat actors, and current detection methods are inadequate.

Innovation Solution

A user mode hook is installed to monitor device handle openings, identify device names associated with known vulnerable drivers, and detect suspicious processes attempting to access these drivers, triggering alerts or termination.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Measurement precision

If a user mode hook is installed to monitor device handle openings, then detection capability against BYOVD attacks is improved, but system complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection capabilityVSAvoidsystem complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a user mode hook as an intermediary component that sits between the process and the device handle opening operation. This hook intercepts device handle openings, parses object paths to identify device names, and compares them against monitored device names associated with vulnerable drivers. By using this intermediary layer, the system achieves precise detection of BYOVD attacks without requiring deep modifications to the core operating system, thus improving detection capability while managing system complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If monitoring is performed on all device handle openings, then detection coverage is improved, but processing overhead increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedetection coverageVSAvoidprocessing overhead
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSUse of energy by moving object

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements local quality by focusing monitoring efforts specifically on device handle openings related to vulnerable drivers rather than all device handles. The system maintains a list of monitored device names associated with known vulnerable drivers and only performs detailed parsing and comparison for device handles that match these monitored names. This selective monitoring approach ensures comprehensive detection coverage for vulnerable drivers while minimizing processing overhead by avoiding unnecessary monitoring of unrelated device handles.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

3Speed

If the system terminates suspicious processes immediately upon detection, then security response time is improved, but false positive rate may increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity response timeVSAvoidfalse positive rate
Core Design Contradiction:
SpeedVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by pre-computing and storing a list of monitored device names associated with vulnerable drivers before runtime monitoring begins. This preliminary preparation allows the system to quickly compare device handles against the pre-prepared list during runtime, enabling fast security response without requiring complex real-time analysis that could lead to false positives. The pre-computed monitoring list acts as a reference that speeds up detection while maintaining reliability through accurate matching.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS12511391B1Detection of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver attacks in Windows-based systems
Publication Date: 2025.12.30 TREND MICRO INC
  • US12511391B1 patent drawing
  • US12511391B1 patent drawing

AI summary

Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks are detected in Windows-based desktop computers. An opening of a device handle to a device object by a process is detected in the desktop computer. An object path that is used in the opening of the device handle is obtained and parsed to identify a device name of the device object. The device name is compared to device names associated with drivers that have known vulnerabilities. The process that opened the device handle is detected as indicative of a BYOVD attack if the device name is associated with a driver that has a known vulnerability and the process is not a normal process.