Dynamic Bid Adjustment for RTB Data Quality

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Solution Overview

Problem

In online advertising, real-time bidding (RTB) exchanges face challenges in accurately determining bid prices due to varying amounts and types of data provided by publishers, which can hinder the probability of conversion and lead to inefficient ad placement, as some publishers withhold data to minimize costs, resulting in reduced bid prices for advertisers.

Innovation Solution

Implementing a system that dynamically adjusts bid prices based on the presence or absence of specific data types by applying penalty or bonus amounts, incentivizing publishers to provide more comprehensive data by linking bid price determination to the quality and quantity of data provided, thereby encouraging higher bid prices for publishers who offer valuable information and penalizing those who withhold it.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Loss of energy

If publishers withhold data to minimize costs, then publication costs are reduced, but bid price accuracy deteriorates and conversion probability decreases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvepublication costVSAvoidbid price accuracy
Core Design Contradiction:
Loss of energyVSMeasurement precision

Solution Approach 1:

The system implements feedback by adjusting bid prices based on the quality and quantity of data provided by publishers. Publishers receive feedback in the form of bid price adjustments that reflect the value of their data contribution, incentivizing them to provide more comprehensive data in future transactions.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Solution Approach 2:

The system changes the parameter of bid price dynamically based on data quality metrics. By varying the bid price parameter according to the completeness and quality of publisher-provided data, the system resolves the contradiction between minimizing publication costs and maintaining bid price accuracy.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

2Measurement precision

If publishers provide comprehensive data, then bid price accuracy improves, but publication costs increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvebid price accuracyVSAvoidpublication cost
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSLoss of energy

Solution Approach 1:

The system applies dynamics by making bid prices flexible and adaptive rather than fixed. Bid prices dynamically adjust based on the data quality provided, allowing publishers to optimize their data provision strategy while maintaining accurate bid pricing.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

The system allows for partial data provision with corresponding partial bid price adjustments. Publishers can choose to provide varying levels of data completeness, and the bid price reflects this partial action, rather than requiring full data provision for any bid.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

3Reliability

If bid prices are adjusted based on data quality, then conversion probability increases, but system complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveconversion probabilityVSAvoidsystem complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The system segments the bid price into base components and adjustment components. The base bid price remains simple, while data quality adjustments are applied as separate modular factors, reducing overall system complexity while maintaining conversion probability.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

4Productivity

If real-time bid adjustments are implemented, then ad placement optimization improves, but processing time increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvead placement optimizationVSAvoidprocessing time
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary actions by pre-establishing bid price adjustment rules and data quality metrics before actual bidding occurs. This preparation allows for rapid real-time adjustments during the bidding process without significant processing delays.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS10262339B2Externality-based advertisement bid and budget allocation adjustment
Publication Date: 2019.04.16 AMOBEE
  • US10262339B2 patent drawing
  • US10262339B2 patent drawing
  • US10262339B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Within a computer networking environment, a first bid request having data is received. Bids are determined for advertisements based on the data associated with such first bid request. It may be determined that the first bid request's data includes one or more specific types of data for a bonus variable. At least a first portion of the bids that were determined for the first bid request are increased by a bonus amount in response to the one or more specific types of data for a bonus variable being determined to be present in the first bid request's data. For the first bid request, an optimum set of one or more of the bids are selected and transmitted, along with a reference to the associated advertisement, via to a sender of the first bid request.