Dynamic Binary Instrumentation for Repackaged Malware Detection

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Solution Overview

Problem

Conventional malware detection methods struggle to identify repackaged malware, which evades detection by obfuscating its code within other executable files or compressing it, making it difficult to detect using traditional pattern matching techniques like deep packet inspection, and require memory dumps that are challenging to analyze for malicious activity.

Innovation Solution

A method that uses dynamic binary instrumentation to monitor and analyze the behavior of program code in real-time, preventing execution of suspected malware using exception handling and scanning for malicious patterns, allowing for detection of malicious code without relying on content-based detection methods.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Measurement precision

If conventional pattern matching methods like deep packet inspection are used to detect malware, then detection of known malware signatures is effective, but detection of repackaged or obfuscated malware fails

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvemalware detection accuracyVSAvoiddetection capability against repackaged malware
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The system transitions from static signature-based detection to dynamic behavior-based detection. By monitoring runtime behavior of code in memory, the system adapts to detect repackaged malware that exhibits characteristic malicious behaviors even when its signature is obscured or modified.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

The detection approach changes from analyzing fixed parameters (signatures, hashes) to monitoring dynamic parameters (behavior patterns, execution sequences). This parameter transformation enables detection of repackaged malware by observing what the code actually does rather than what it claims to be.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

2Loss of information

If memory dumps are taken for malware analysis, then malware code can be extracted, but analysis becomes challenging due to mixture of normal and malicious data

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvemalware code extractionVSAvoidanalysis complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Loss of informationVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The system extracts only the relevant malicious components from memory by monitoring and tracking code execution behavior. Instead of analyzing entire memory dumps, it isolates and analyzes specific code segments that exhibit suspicious behavior patterns, significantly reducing analysis complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The system introduces an intermediary monitoring layer that observes code execution and identifies malicious behavior patterns. This intermediary acts as a filter between the complex memory contents and the analysis process, presenting only the relevant malicious elements for analysis.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

3Measurement precision

If repackaged malware is executed to analyze its behavior, then detection of obfuscated malware is possible, but the malware can cause damage before detection

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveobfuscated malware detectionVSAvoidmalware damage potential
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary detection by monitoring code behavior as it is being executed in memory, before the malware can complete its malicious payload. By detecting suspicious behavior patterns early in the execution sequence, the system can intervene and prevent damage while still maintaining detection accuracy.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The system rapidly analyzes code execution behavior and makes quick determination about maliciousness, rushing through the detection process before the malware can cause significant harm. This time-compressed detection approach maintains accuracy while minimizing damage potential.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #21Skipping (Rushing through)

Data Source

PatentUS10902122B2Just in time memory analysis for malware detection
Publication Date: 2021.01.26 SONICWALL INC
  • US10902122B2 patent drawing
  • US10902122B2 patent drawing
  • US10902122B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Methods and apparatus consistent with the present disclosure may use instrumentation code that remains transparent to an application program that the instrumentation code has been injected into. In certain instances, data sets that include executable code may be received via packetized communications or be received via other means, such as, receiving a file from a data store. The present technique allows one or more processors executing instrumentation code to monitor actions performed by the program code included in a received data set. Malware can be detected using exception handling to track memory allocations of the program code included in the received data set.