Dynamic Cryptographic Key Management for Cached Data Compromise

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current data storage systems face complexity in managing cryptographic key compromise situations, particularly in cache layers, where extensive sweep and convert operations are required to re-encrypt data, leading to processing overhead and inefficiency.

Innovation Solution

A dynamic and agnostic cryptographic key management system that abstracts key management from the cache layer, using a key table and encryption headers to manage key rotations and compromises without requiring extensive sweep and convert operations, leveraging SSD memory's transient nature for efficient eviction and re-encryption.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If the cache layer manages all cryptographic artefacts and key management needed to secure cached data, then data security is improved, but processing overhead and device complexity increase significantly

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata securityVSAvoidcache layer complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

A dedicated cryptographic key management module is introduced as an intermediary between the cache layer and key management operations. This module handles all cryptographic artefacts and key management tasks, allowing the cache layer to focus on data caching while maintaining security. The intermediary module manages key rotation, compromise detection, and re-encryption workflows without requiring the cache layer to understand cryptographic intricacies.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

Key management responsibilities are extracted from the cache layer and placed in a separate cryptographic key management module. This extraction removes the burden of managing cryptographic artefacts from the cache layer, reducing its complexity while maintaining data security through dedicated key management functionality.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

2Reliability

If the entire data set is scanned to find data dependent on a compromised key, then security is improved by ensuring all dependencies are handled, but productivity and time consumption increase

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidkey rotation efficiency
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSProductivity

Solution Approach 1:

Data is pre-tagged with cryptographic metadata including key identifiers and dependency information during the initial encryption process. This preliminary action creates an index structure that allows the key management module to quickly locate all data dependent on a compromised key without scanning the entire data set, significantly improving key rotation efficiency while maintaining security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The data set is segmented and organized by cryptographic key dependencies using metadata tags. This segmentation allows the system to efficiently identify and process only the relevant data segments associated with a compromised key rather than scanning all data, improving productivity during key rotation operations.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

3Reliability

If cached data is re-encrypted with a new key after compromise detection, then security is improved, but processing overhead increases

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidprocessing overhead
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSUse of energy by moving object

Solution Approach 1:

Instead of re-encrypting the entire cached data set when a key compromise is detected, the system performs partial re-encryption only on the specific data segments that were encrypted with the compromised key. This selective approach, enabled by the metadata indexing system, maintains security by re-encrypting affected data while minimizing processing overhead by leaving unaffected data unchanged.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

4Reliability

If the cache layer is made aware of key-state transitions and compromised key workflows, then cache data management security is improved, but ease of operation and device complexity worsen

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecache data management securityVSAvoidcache layer operation simplicity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSEase of operation

Solution Approach 1:

The cryptographic key management module serves as an intermediary that absorbs the complexity of key-state transitions and compromised key workflows. The cache layer interacts with this intermediary through simplified interfaces, maintaining security without requiring direct awareness or handling of complex cryptographic workflows.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The cryptographic key management module autonomously handles key-state transitions, compromise detection, and re-encryption workflows without requiring the cache layer to understand or manage these processes. The system self-services the key management aspects while the cache layer continues its primary function of data caching with operational simplicity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Data Source

PatentUS12047499B2Dynamic cryptographic key management for handling key compromises in cached data and metadata
Publication Date: 2024.07.23 DELL PROD LP
  • US12047499B2 patent drawing
  • US12047499B2 patent drawing
  • US12047499B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Embodiments of a cryptographic key management system for cached data that efficiently re-encrypts cached data encrypted with a compromised encryption key by receiving a request to access a cached data block encrypted with an original encryption key. Upon determining that the original encryption key is compromised or destroyed, thus resulting in the requested data block being invalid, evicting the requested data block from the cache storing the cached data. The data block is re-encrypted using a new encryption key upon receipt of a new request to access the cached data. Any remaining cached data encrypted with the original encryption key is evicted from the cache through a defined cache eviction policy.