Dynamic Data Tainting Gateway for Cross-Site Scripting Defense
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Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional signature or pattern-based detection techniques are ineffective against increasing security threats, particularly cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in web applications that can access and transmit sensitive information, especially with the rise of dynamic code usage in modern web applications.
Innovation Solution
A system and method utilizing dynamic data tainting, where a gateway communicatively coupled to client devices and networks tracks and blocks the transmission of tainted data by executing computer code received from non-trusted entities, identifying attempts to access and transmit sensitive information, and preventing such transmissions.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If conventional signature or pattern based detection techniques are used, then detection simplicity is maintained, but detection effectiveness deteriorates against cross-site scripting vulnerabilities and dynamic code
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements dynamic data tainting that tracks data flow and execution paths in real-time, adapting to dynamic code behavior rather than relying on static signatures. The system dynamically monitors memory regions and execution contexts to detect cross-site scripting attacks, transforming the detection mechanism from static pattern matching to dynamic behavior analysis.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary tainting mechanism between data storage and transmission. This intermediary layer marks sensitive data as 'tainted' and monitors all access and transmission operations, acting as a mediator that detects malicious code attempts to exfiltrate sensitive information without requiring complex signature analysis.
2Reliability
If dynamic data tainting with execution tracking is implemented, then detection effectiveness against malicious code improves, but system performance and execution speed deteriorate
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies local quality by tainting only specific memory regions and data structures that contain sensitive information, rather than monitoring entire memory spaces. This selective tainting approach reduces the overhead of execution tracking while maintaining effective detection of cross-site scripting attacks targeting sensitive data.
Solution Approach 2:
The implementation uses partial monitoring by tracking only the execution paths and memory accesses relevant to tainted data, rather than comprehensive instrumentation of all code execution. This partial action approach maintains security detection accuracy while minimizing performance impact on legitimate code execution.
3Reliability
If comprehensive tracking of all code execution is performed, then detection completeness improves, but computational resource consumption increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent performs preliminary action by marking data as tainted before it is accessed or transmitted. This advance preparation allows the system to track only the flow of already-identified sensitive data rather than monitoring all possible data access patterns, reducing computational resources while maintaining detection completeness for malicious code.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent extracts and isolates the tainting and tracking functionality from the main code execution path. By separating the monitoring mechanism into a dedicated tainting system that operates on specific data structures, the patent reduces the computational burden on legitimate code execution while maintaining comprehensive tracking of sensitive information flow.
Data Source
AI summary
Blocking transmission of tainted data using dynamic data tainting is described. For example, sensitive information is stored on a client device as tainted data. The client device generates a data request for retrieving data from a non-trusted entity via a network. A gateway is communicatively coupled to the client device and the network. The gateway receives computer code from the non-trusted entity via the network. The gateway executes the computer code. The gateway tracks the execution of the computer code to determine whether the computer code attempts to access tainted data and transmit the tainted data to an outside entity. The gateway blocks the transmission of the tainted data to the outside entity responsive to determining that the computer code has attempted to access tainted data and transmit the tainted data to an outside entity.