Dynamic Intrinsic Chip Identification via PUF Verification

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Existing intrinsic chip identification methods face challenges in securely authenticating dynamic intrinsic chip identifiers, particularly in ensuring that counter information, frequencies, and responses match expected values over time, which affects the reliability and security of authentication processes.

Innovation Solution

A method and system for intrinsic chip identification that involves receiving and verifying counter information, frequencies, and responses, using a physically unclonable function (PUF) device to synchronize counts and frequencies, and updating historical data to adapt to changes, ensuring secure authentication by matching expected values and granting access only when conditions are met.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If intrinsic chip identifiers are made dynamic to improve security, then authentication reliability is improved, but the complexity of verifying matching values across multiple parameters (counter information, frequencies, responses) increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauthentication reliabilityVSAvoidverification process complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The verification process is segmented into three distinct parameter checks: counter information verification, frequency verification, and response verification. Each parameter is independently verified against stored expected values, allowing the complex authentication process to be broken down into manageable, modular verification steps that can be executed systematically

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements feedback mechanisms where each verification step (counter match, frequency match, response match) provides feedback on authentication status. The authentication decision is granted only when all three feedback signals confirm matching values, creating a reliable multi-layered verification feedback loop that enhances authentication reliability

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

2Adaptability or versatility

If historical data is updated to adapt to changes in intrinsic chip identifiers, then adaptability is improved, but the risk of accepting unauthorized changes increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveadaptation to identifier changesVSAvoidsecurity integrity
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The system performs preliminary verification of all three parameters (counter information, frequencies, and responses) against stored historical data before updating. Only after confirming that all current values match the expected stored values does the system proceed to update the historical data with new values, ensuring that updates only occur when authenticity is pre-verified

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The system converts the potential harm of unauthorized changes into a benefit by using the verification process itself as a security mechanism. Any attempt to unauthorizedly modify identifiers will fail the verification check against stored expected values, thereby preventing the update and actually strengthening security by detecting and blocking the unauthorized change attempt

Inventive Principle:
Principle #22Blessing in disguise (Convert harm into benefit)

Data Source

PatentUS10142335B2Dynamic intrinsic chip identification
Publication Date: 2018.11.27 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINE CORPORATION
  • US10142335B2 patent drawing
  • US10142335B2 patent drawing
  • US10142335B2 patent drawing

AI summary

An apparatus, method, system, and program product are disclosed for intrinsic chip identification. One method includes receiving first counter information from a device, determining whether such information matches second counter information, receiving first frequencies from the device, determining whether each frequency of such frequencies is within a predetermined range of a corresponding frequency of second frequencies, receiving a response to a challenge sent to the device, determining whether the response matches an expected response, and granting authentication. Granting authentication may include granting authentication in response to: the first counter information matching the second counter information; each frequency of the first frequencies being within the predetermined range of a corresponding frequency of the second frequencies; and the expected response matching the response. The expected response may be updated over time. The security apparatus may include circuitry that is shared with circuitry outside the security apparatus for computations other than authentication.