Dynamic Kernel Security Modules With Hot-Patch Policy Control
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing kernel-level security modules in Linux systems lack flexibility and cannot be dynamically enabled or disabled at runtime, limiting their effectiveness against evolving security threats.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a loadable kernel module (LKM) that allows for hot patching of the kernel, enabling or disabling security policies at runtime through techniques like ftrace, kprobes, or hardware interruptions to intercept and enforce security policies without altering the kernel's initial state.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If static LSMs are integrated into the kernel at build time, then security policy enforcement is achieved, but flexibility and adaptability at runtime are lost
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements dynamic security modules that can be loaded and unloaded at runtime through a loading mechanism. The security module transitions from a static build-time integration to a dynamic runtime-loading architecture, allowing the kernel to adapt security policies without rebuilding. The module includes initialization code that executes upon loading, enabling runtime configuration and adaptation of security enforcement mechanisms.
Solution Approach 2:
The security functionality is segmented into a separate loadable module rather than being monolithically integrated into the kernel. This segmentation allows the security module to be independently loaded, unloaded, and configured at runtime, providing flexibility while maintaining security enforcement capabilities. The module structure separates security logic from the core kernel, enabling adaptive security policies.
2Reliability
If the kernel is rebuilt to enable LSMs, then security policies can be enforced, but system downtime and complexity increase
Solution Approach 1:
The security module is prepared in advance as a compile-ready object file with embedded initialization code, but integration into the kernel is deferred until runtime loading. This preliminary preparation allows the module to be pre-configured and validated without requiring kernel rebuilds, simplifying the deployment process while maintaining security enforcement capabilities.
Solution Approach 2:
A loading mechanism acts as an intermediary between the static security module and the running kernel. This intermediary component handles the dynamic loading, initialization, and integration of the security module without requiring kernel rebuilds, thereby simplifying the configuration process while ensuring proper security policy enforcement.
3Adaptability or versatility
If security modules are made dynamic and loadable, then runtime flexibility is improved, but kernel complexity and potential stability risks increase
Solution Approach 1:
The loading mechanism is designed with universal functionality to handle multiple aspects of security module integration through a unified interface. It performs loading, initialization, registration, and unloading operations through a single multi-functional mechanism, reducing overall system complexity despite the added dynamic capabilities.
Solution Approach 2:
The security module includes self-initialization code that automatically executes upon loading, performing registration and configuration tasks without requiring extensive external setup. This self-service approach reduces the complexity of the loading mechanism by minimizing the coordination overhead needed between the loader and the security module.
Data Source
AI summary
Disclosed embodiments relate to systems and methods for securing kernel-level system functions. Techniques include hot patching of a kernel by a kernel module loaded into the kernel; identifying a kernel function initiated by a system call associated with a user-level application; intercepting the kernel function by the kernel module; making available, to a security agent, an indication of at least one operation associated with the kernel function; receiving, from the security agent, a determination of whether the at least one operation associated with the kernel function violates at least one security policy; and based on the determination indicating the at least one operation does not violate the at least one security policy, allowing the system call to the kernel; or based on the determination indicating the at least one operation violates at least one security policy, performing at least one control action.