Dynamic Pre-Boot Storage Encryption Key Management
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Solution Overview
Problem
Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) face security issues due to susceptibility to malware and eavesdropping, with existing key management methods being inefficient, such as reliance on network connectivity for decryption keys, which can lead to operational delays and compromised security across multiple ATMs if a single location's key is compromised.
Innovation Solution
A dynamic pre-boot storage encryption key management method where a key is obtained and used to decrypt subsequent portions of storage, with a randomly generated key encryption algorithm ensuring secure decryption and re-encryption of the hard drive, preventing key storage on the drive and reliance on remote servers, and varying the encryption algorithm with each boot cycle.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the decryption key is stored on a remote server, then security is improved, but network connectivity issues cause operational delays and inability to obtain the key
Solution Approach 1:
The decryption key is segmented into multiple encrypted portions distributed across different locations on the hard drive. Each portion can be independently decrypted using different algorithms, allowing the system to reconstruct the full key locally without requiring continuous network connectivity to a remote server.
Solution Approach 2:
The key portions are pre-distributed and encrypted on the hard drive before boot. The pre-boot manager is pre-configured to locate and decrypt these portions using algorithms also stored on the drive, enabling key reconstruction to occur locally during boot without waiting for network retrieval from a remote server.
2Productivity
If the decryption key is stored on the hard drive in a designated unencrypted area, then operational speed is improved, but security is compromised if that location is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
Instead of storing the decryption key in a single unencrypted location, the key is divided into multiple encrypted portions distributed across different locations on the hard drive. Each portion is encrypted with a different algorithm, so compromising one location does not expose the full key.
Solution Approach 2:
Different portions of the key are encrypted with different algorithms and stored in different locations on the hard drive. This creates local variability in security properties, so that each location has its own encryption characteristics rather than all locations having the same vulnerability.
3Productivity
If the decryption key is stored on the hard drive, then network connectivity is not required, but re-encryption must be performed if the key is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The decryption key is segmented into multiple portions that can be independently re-encrypted. If one portion is compromised, only that specific portion needs to be re-encrypted rather than the entire key, significantly reducing the time and effort required for remediation.
Solution Approach 2:
If a key portion is compromised, that specific portion can be discarded and a new portion generated and encrypted in its place. The system recovers security by replacing only the compromised segment rather than re-encrypting the entire key infrastructure.
4Device complexity
If multiple ATMs share the same key location on the hard drive, then device complexity is reduced, but security is compromised across all ATMs if that location is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
Each ATM is configured with unique local qualities in its key management: different algorithms, different key portions, and different locations on the hard drive. This local differentiation ensures that compromising one ATM does not compromise others, even though the overall approach remains relatively simple.
Solution Approach 2:
The key management system is segmented so that each ATM has its own set of key portions and algorithms. This segmentation isolates security vulnerabilities to individual ATMs rather than affecting the entire network, while maintaining relatively simple key management procedures.
Data Source
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AI summary
During a pre-boot cycle of a device an algorithm is obtained from a first portion of a hard drive (115 or 402) (step 210). The algorithm is executed to obtain a key (step 220). The key is used to decrypt a second portion of the hard drive (115 or 402) to obtain a second key (step 230). The second key is used to dynamically decrypt a third portion of the hard drive (115 or 402). A new randomly generated version of the algorithm may be produced (step 250). The new version of the algorithm may be stored in the first portion of the hard drive (115 or 402). The new version of the algorithm may be executed to produce a new randomly generated version of the key. The new version of the key may be used to reencrypt the second portion of the hard drive (115 or 402) having the second key.