Dynamic Resource Allocation System for Ticket Auctions

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Solution Overview

Problem

Conventional methods for allocating finite or limited resources, such as event tickets, often lack flexibility, result in unfair distribution, and fail to maximize the utilization of available units, leading to unsold seats.

Innovation Solution

An electronic ticket auction system that allows users to bid for tickets, with features like dynamic pricing, seat allocation based on bid amounts, and reallocation of tickets to ensure contiguous seating, while also providing options for charitable donations and flexible bidding increments.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Adaptability or versatility

If conventional auction methods are used to allocate tickets, then the allocation process is simple, but the flexibility and fairness of distribution are limited

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveflexibility of allocationVSAvoidcomplexity of allocation system
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements dynamic allocation where ticket prices and allocation rules change based on real-time bidding behavior, demand patterns, and auction progression. The system adjusts allocation parameters dynamically rather than using fixed conventional auction rules, thereby increasing flexibility without requiring complete system redesign

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

The system changes multiple parameters including bid increments, allocation thresholds, pricing models, and eligibility criteria based on auction conditions. By allowing parameter adjustment during the allocation process, the system achieves greater adaptability while maintaining a manageable complexity level through automated parameter management

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

2Quantity of substance

If conventional allocation methods are used, then the system is easy to operate, but too few units are distributed and resources are underutilized

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvenumber of tickets soldVSAvoidease of bidding process
Core Design Contradiction:
Quantity of substanceVSEase of operation

Solution Approach 1:

The system allows bidders to place multiple bids at different price levels and for different ticket quantities. This partial action approach enables the system to distribute more tickets by accepting bids that may not initially meet full allocation thresholds, thereby increasing the number of tickets sold while keeping the bidding interface simple

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

Solution Approach 2:

The automated allocation system self-adjusts to maximize ticket distribution by automatically processing bids, determining allocation eligibility, and managing pricing without requiring complex user intervention. This maintains ease of operation while achieving higher distribution volumes through algorithmic optimization

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Reliability

If conventional auction systems are used, then the pricing structure is straightforward, but the distribution becomes unfair and less efficient

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvefairness of distributionVSAvoidcomplexity of pricing mechanism
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The system incorporates feedback loops where allocation outcomes, bidding patterns, and pricing results are continuously monitored and used to adjust subsequent allocations. This feedback mechanism ensures fair distribution by identifying and correcting biases in the allocation process while managing complexity through automated feedback processing

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Solution Approach 2:

The system establishes predetermined allocation rules, eligibility criteria, and fairness constraints before the auction begins. These preliminary actions create a fair framework that guides the allocation process, ensuring reliability while reducing the need for complex real-time decision-making

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

4Productivity

If simple allocation rules are applied, then the process is fast, but seats remain unsold and resource utilization is low

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveefficiency of ticket salesVSAvoidnumber of tickets allocated
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSQuantity of substance

Solution Approach 1:

The allocation process operates continuously throughout the auction, with the system constantly evaluating bids, adjusting prices, and allocating tickets rather than using discrete batch processing. This continuous action maximizes ticket sales by capturing every viable bidding opportunity while maintaining processing efficiency through automated continuous evaluation

Inventive Principle:
Principle #20Continuity of useful action

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements periodic allocation reviews at structured intervals during the auction, allowing efficient batch processing while ensuring comprehensive ticket distribution. These periodic actions balance processing speed with thorough evaluation, preventing both oversimplification and excessive complexity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #19Periodic action

Data Source

PatentUS8315918B1Systems for dynamically allocating finite or unique resources
Publication Date: 2012.11.20 TICKETMASTER
  • US8315918B1 patent drawing
  • US8315918B1 patent drawing
  • US8315918B1 patent drawing

AI summary

The present invention is related to electronically allocating finite or limited resources. In an embodiment, a computer system is configured to receive bids over a network from a first plurality of users for a limited number of units, the bids including associated bid amounts. A data store is operable to store the bid amounts. Program code is stored in computer readable memory and is configured to determine which bids are winning bids, determine a unit price for units associated with the winning bids, wherein the unit price associated with the winning bids is based on the lowest winning bid amount, and units can be tickets.