eBPF Kernel Hooking for Real-Time Process and File Prevention

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Existing methods for implementing hooking logic in the kernel, such as using kernel extensions or the Apple Endpoint Security library, are limited by kernel security rules, restricting the complexity of logic that can be executed and lacking real-time prevention capabilities.

Innovation Solution

Utilizing extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBpf) programs to execute sandboxed programs within the kernel, employing tailing mechanisms and eBpf maps to invoke multiple hooks with custom logic, and using override returns to prevent malicious activity.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Adaptability or versatility

If kernel extensions or Apple Endpoint Security library are used to implement hooking logic, then real-time detection and response capability is achieved, but the complexity of logic that can be executed is limited by kernel security rules

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecomplexity of executable logicVSAvoidkernel security constraints
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces eBpf as an intermediary layer between user-space applications and the kernel. eBpf programs execute in a sandboxed environment within the kernel, allowing complex logic to be implemented without directly modifying kernel code or bypassing security rules. This intermediary enables sophisticated hooking logic while maintaining kernel security integrity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent changes the execution parameter from traditional kernel extensions to eBpf programs. eBpf programs can be loaded, attached to kernel functions, and executed with controlled privileges. This parameter change allows complex logic execution while maintaining security through the eBpf verifier and sandboxing mechanisms.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

2Power

If traditional hooking methods are used, then kernel security rules are maintained, but the computational power and logic complexity are unnecessarily limited

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecomputational power in kernelVSAvoidkernel architecture complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
PowerVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the hooking logic into separate eBpf programs that can be independently loaded, attached, and executed. Each eBpf program is a self-contained unit that can be attached to specific kernel functions, allowing modular complexity management. This segmentation enables sophisticated logic without requiring complex kernel architecture modifications.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

3Adaptability or versatility

If eBpf sandboxed programs are executed within the kernel, then complex rule-based prevention logic is enabled, but additional security verification layers are introduced

Engineering Contradiction:
Improverule-based prevention capabilityVSAvoidsecurity verification layers
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The eBpf verifier performs automatic security verification of eBpf programs before they are executed in the kernel. The verifier checks program correctness, security, and compatibility without requiring manual review or additional verification layers. This self-service approach enables complex rule-based prevention logic while maintaining security through automated verification.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Data Source

PatentUS20250348576A1Systems and methods for process and file behavioral execution prevention
Publication Date: 2025.11.13 CYBEREASON INC
  • US20250348576A1 patent drawing
  • US20250348576A1 patent drawing
  • US20250348576A1 patent drawing

AI summary

Disclosed is a method for process and file behavioral execution prevention. The method can include executing a sandboxed program within a kernel of a computing device; detecting, via the sandboxed program, an event or a condition; in response to detecting the event or condition, invoking a callback function executing custom logic; invoking, via a tailing mechanism, a second sandboxed program to execute within the kernel; and writing outputs of the first and second sandboxed programs to a shared map.