Elliptic Curve Cryptography Scalar Multiplication Side-Channel Countermeasure

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative Solutions
Generate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

Conventional approaches to countermeasures for simple side-channel attacks in elliptic curve cryptography are not sufficiently optimized, impacting the performance of the system by making observable information dependent on the secret scalar, which can be exploited for timing or power consumption attacks.

Innovation Solution

Implementing an elliptic curve cryptographic scheme that uses Jacobian projective coordinate representation for scalar multiplication, where each iteration performs either doubling or mixed addition of points, with a dummy operation that has a computational cost of one operation, and transforming the result to affine coordinates, making the operations indistinguishable in terms of time and power consumption.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If conventional scalar multiplication algorithms are used in ECC, then the cryptographic scheme is efficient and fast, but the execution time and power consumption depend on the secret scalar d, making the system vulnerable to simple side-channel attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity against side-channel attacksVSAvoidcomplexity of scalar multiplication algorithm
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent changes the operational parameters by introducing dummy operations that modify the execution profile of the scalar multiplication algorithm. Specifically, it adds extra operations (such as extra point additions or dummy scalar multiplications) that change the timing and power consumption characteristics without affecting the cryptographic correctness, thereby decoupling the observable side-channels from the secret scalar d

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces intermediary dummy operations as mediators between the actual cryptographic computation and the external observer. These dummy operations act as a buffer that masks the true computational path, making it impossible for an attacker to directly observe the relationship between execution characteristics and the secret scalar through operations like point doubling or addition

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If dummy operations are added to countermeasure simple side-channel attacks, then security is improved, but the computational cost and execution time increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity against simple side-channel attacksVSAvoidexecution speed of scalar multiplication
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSProductivity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies partial dummy operations rather than complete masking for all operations. Instead of adding dummy operations for every single computational step, it strategically inserts them at specific points in the algorithm (such as after certain iterations or under specific conditions), providing sufficient security against simple SCA while minimizing the impact on overall execution speed

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent segments the scalar multiplication algorithm into distinct phases or iterations, applying dummy operations selectively to certain segments rather than uniformly across the entire computation. This segmentation allows the system to balance security requirements with performance constraints by concentrating countermeasures where they are most effective

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Data Source

PatentUS11128434B2Elliptic curve cryptography scheme with simple side-channel attack countermeasure
Publication Date: 2021.09.21 INFOSEC GLOBAL
  • US11128434B2 patent drawing
  • US11128434B2 patent drawing
  • US11128434B2 patent drawing

AI summary

There is provided an elliptic curve cryptographic scheme for permitting secure communications between two or more cryptographic correspondent devices, with a simple side-channel attack countermeasure. The cryptographic scheme includes: transforming a point to Jacobian projective coordinates; constant-time scalar multiplication of the point by a parameter; and transforming the resultant of the scalar multiplication to affine coordinates. The scalar multiplication including: performing iteratively to the value of the parameter either one of: doubling of the point and multiplying any two random field elements; or mixed addition of the point.