ECDHE Key Exchange Mutual Authentication via Key Server
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current ephemeral elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (ECDHE) systems lack mutual authentication, are susceptible to 'man in the middle' attacks, and do not provide forward secrecy, leading to security risks and the need for separate authentication steps, especially in scenarios involving multiple parties and key servers.
Innovation Solution
A system that enables a server to conduct a mutually authenticated ephemeral elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange with a device using a key server, where the device and server record and operate compatible values and algorithms for key pair generation, ECDH key exchange, key derivation, and symmetric ciphering, without requiring the server to record or operate with static private keys.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Productivity
If ECDHE key exchange is used to establish secure communication, then key derivation speed and efficiency are improved, but mutual authentication and forward secrecy are not provided
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the authentication and key exchange functions into separate modules: the ECDHE key exchange module for efficient key derivation, and the ECDSA authentication module for mutual authentication. This allows each module to operate independently and optimally, resolving the contradiction between speed and security.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent merges ECDHE key exchange with ECDSA authentication into a unified protocol that performs both key derivation and mutual authentication in a coordinated manner. The combination leverages the speed of ECDHE while adding the security of ECDSA verification, achieving both high productivity and reliability.
2Loss of time
If ECDHE key exchange is used for secure communication, then processing time is reduced, but susceptibility to man in the middle attacks increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary anti-action by implementing ECDSA signature verification before the ECDHE key exchange completes. The authentication signatures are verified in advance to establish trusted identities, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks before they can compromise the fast key exchange process.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces digital signatures as an intermediary mechanism that mediates between the fast ECDHE key exchange and the security requirement. The signatures act as a trusted intermediary that validates the identities of communicating parties, allowing the fast key exchange to proceed securely without direct verification overhead.
3Reliability
If separate authentication steps are implemented for ECDHE, then mutual authentication is achieved, but system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent merges the authentication and key exchange protocols into a single integrated flow where ECDSA signatures and ECDHE key exchange operations are coordinated through a unified protocol structure. This reduces system complexity by eliminating the need for separate authentication steps while maintaining mutual authentication.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent creates a universal protocol that handles both authentication and key derivation in a single framework. The same protocol structure supports both the ECDSA verification for authentication and the ECDHE operations for key generation, reducing overall system complexity through multi-functionality.
4Reliability
If static private keys are recorded by the server, then authentication is enabled, but security risks from key leakage increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent uses ephemeral key pairs for each ECDHE key exchange session instead of relying on long-lived static private keys stored on the server. These temporary keys provide authentication capability for the session but are discarded afterward, eliminating the security risk of key leakage while maintaining authentication.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent extracts the static private key storage requirement from the server system. Instead of the server recording and managing static private keys, the authentication is performed using ephemeral keys generated during each session, removing the vulnerable key storage component from the server while preserving authentication capability.
Data Source
AI summary
A server can record a device static public key (Sd) and a server static private key (ss). The server can receive a message with (i) a device ephemeral public key (Ed) and (ii) a ciphertext encrypted with key K1. The server can (i) conduct an EC point addition operation on Sd and Ed and (ii) send the resulting point/secret X0 to a key server. The key server can (i) perform a first elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange using X0 and a network static private key to derive a point/secret X1, and (ii) send X1 to the server. The server can conduct a second ECDH key exchange using the server static private key and point X0 to derive point X2. The server can conduct an EC point addition on X1 and X2 to derive X3. The server can derive K1 using X3 and decrypt the ciphertext.