ECDSA Nonce Masking Across Heterogeneous Crypto Co-Processors
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Solution Overview
Problem
ECDSA nonces are vulnerable to physical attacks, such as side-channel and fault attacks, particularly when transferred between symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic co-processors in heterogeneous systems, lacking comprehensive protection during their lifecycle.
Innovation Solution
Implement a dual-masking strategy using Boolean and arithmetic masking techniques to secure ECDSA nonces from generation to utilization, involving symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic co-processors, ensuring confidentiality and integrity through modular arithmetic shares.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Adaptability or versatility
If ECDSA nonces are transferred between symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic co-processors in heterogeneous systems, then cryptographic functionality is improved, but vulnerability to physical attacks increases
Solution Approach 1:
The nonce is divided into multiple shares using secret sharing schemes, where each share is distributed to different co-processors. This segmentation ensures that no single processor holds the complete nonce, preventing physical attacks from compromising the entire cryptographic operation while maintaining the ability to perform ECDSA across heterogeneous processors.
Solution Approach 2:
A secure communication interface acts as an intermediary between symmetric and asymmetric co-processors, implementing protected transfer mechanisms for nonce shares. This intermediary layer provides authentication, encryption, and integrity checking during nonce transmission, preventing physical attacks such as side-channel and fault attacks while enabling cryptographic functionality across processor boundaries.
2Reliability
If comprehensive protection is implemented for ECDSA nonces throughout their lifecycle, then security is improved, but performance overhead increases
Solution Approach 1:
Security measures such as nonce generation, sharing, and protection mechanisms are implemented in advance before the ECDSA operation begins. By preparing masked shares and establishing secure communication channels beforehand, the system reduces the need for additional protective operations during the critical signing path, thereby maintaining performance while ensuring security.
3Object-affected harmful factors
If masking techniques are applied to ECDSA nonces, then protection against physical attacks is improved, but computational complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system changes the representation parameters of the nonce from plaintext to masked shares using Boolean and arithmetic masking. This parameter transformation provides protection against physical attacks by hiding the actual nonce values during processing, while the masking operations are designed to be computationally efficient and compatible with existing cryptographic algorithms.
Data Source
AI summary
Systems and methods for securing an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) nonce communicated between symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic co-processors in a heterogeneous system are discussed. In some embodiments, a processor may include: a symmetric portion configured to generate Boolean masked shares, wherein the Boolean masked shares constitute a nonce; and an asymmetric portion coupled to the symmetric portion, the asymmetric portion configured to produce an ECDSA signature based, at least in part, upon the nonce.