ECU Message Authentication Code Length Verification

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing message authentication code (MAC) verification processes in electronic control units (ECUs) are vulnerable to attackers who can efficiently reconstruct correct MACs by guessing bit values one at a time, especially when MAC lengths are truncated, allowing attackers to determine MAC values without knowing the secret key.

Innovation Solution

Implementing a method where ECUs reject MACs with lengths less than a predefined bit value, forcing attackers to guess multiple bit values simultaneously by comparing the received MAC length with a predefined minimum MAC length, thereby increasing the difficulty of MAC reconstruction.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If MAC verification is implemented without length checking, then authentication can proceed efficiently, but attackers can reconstruct correct MACs by guessing bit values one at a time

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauthentication securityVSAvoidverification process complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by performing MAC length verification before the actual MAC comparison. The receiving ECU checks if the received MAC length matches the expected length derived from the secret key configuration. This preliminary check prevents attackers from exploiting bit-by-bit guessing attacks, as the verification process is terminated early when length mismatches are detected, thereby enhancing security without significantly increasing overall system complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

2Quantity of substance

If truncated MACs are accepted, then communication bandwidth is reduced, but attackers can efficiently interrogate the system to determine MAC values

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata transmission volumeVSAvoidvulnerability to MAC reconstruction attacks
Core Design Contradiction:
Quantity of substanceVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies parameter changes by dynamically adjusting the MAC length parameter based on the secret key configuration. Different secret keys are associated with different predefined MAC lengths, and the receiving ECU verifies that the received MAC length matches the expected length for the selected key. This parameter binding ensures that truncated MACs cannot be exploited for bit-by-bit guessing attacks, as the length itself becomes a verification criterion that prevents such attacks while still allowing efficient bandwidth-optimized communication.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

3Adaptability or versatility

If multiple secret keys with different MAC lengths are supported, then authentication flexibility is improved, but key selection and verification complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauthentication configuration flexibilityVSAvoidkey management complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies segmentation by dividing the authentication system into distinct key-configured verification paths. Each secret key is associated with a specific predefined MAC length, creating separate verification channels. The receiving ECU selects the appropriate verification path based on the transmitted key identifier, ensuring that each key-MAC length combination is verified independently. This segmentation approach manages complexity by organizing multiple keys into discrete, manageable segments rather than requiring a single complex verification logic.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Data Source

PatentUS9425963B2Securing electronic control units using message authentication codes
Publication Date: 2016.08.23 GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS LLC
  • US9425963B2 patent drawing
  • US9425963B2 patent drawing
  • US9425963B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A method of securing electronic control units (ECUs) using message authentication codes includes receiving a message authentication code (MAC) at an ECU; determining that the length of the MAC is greater than or equal to a predefined bit value; authenticating the MAC when the length of the MAC has been determined to be equal to or greater than the predefined bit value; and rejecting the MAC when the length of the MAC has been determined to be less than the predefined bit value.