Edge Key Revocation Through Verified Software Updates
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Solution Overview
Problem
Edge devices, limited to communication within a local network, face challenges in securely performing remote key revocation due to their inability to verify key revocation requests directly with a third-party authority, making them susceptible to unauthorized key revocation by compromised host systems.
Innovation Solution
Embed key revocation instructions within secure software update instructions, verified using multiple keys from different parties, ensuring the device executes the instructions only if they are validated by both keys, thereby preventing unauthorized key revocation.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If key revocation requests are accepted from host systems without third-party verification, then key revocation can be performed on edge devices, but the devices become susceptible to unauthorized key revocation by compromised host systems
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a software update package as an intermediary carrier that transports key revocation instructions from the host system to the edge device. This intermediary structure allows the revocation request to be delivered without requiring direct trust between the host system and edge device, as the software update package itself serves as the verification medium through its digital signature.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent embeds the key revocation instructions within a software update package that is pre-signed with a digital signature before being transmitted to the edge device. This preliminary action of signing the package in advance allows the edge device to verify the authenticity of the revocation request without needing real-time communication with a third-party authority, thus preventing unauthorized revocation while maintaining operational capability.
2Adaptability or versatility
If edge devices cannot communicate with third-party authorities, then they maintain local network isolation, but they cannot verify key revocation requests directly
Solution Approach 1:
The patent creates a copy of the third-party authority's digital signature on the software update package, which contains the key revocation instructions. The edge device can verify this copied signature locally using the public key of the third-party authority that is already stored in the device, eliminating the need for direct communication with the authority while maintaining verification capability.
3Reliability
If multiple keys from different parties are required for validation, then unauthorized key revocation is prevented, but the complexity of the revocation process increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent merges the key revocation instructions with the software update package into a single unified structure. The digital signature on the package combines the authentication of both the software update and the key revocation instructions, allowing the edge device to verify both functions simultaneously through a single verification process rather than separate verification steps.
Data Source
AI summary
Described herein are techniques of remotely performing key revocation on a device that cannot communicate outside of a local network of the device. The techniques involve including key revocation instructions in software update instructions that are sent to the device. The device may verify the software update instructions using one or more keys to determine whether they are safe for execution on the device. For example, the device may verify that the software update instructions have been sent by a trusted software provider. The device may execute the key revocation instructions included in the software update instruction to revoke use of a key of the key(s), and initiate use of a new key in place of the revoked key.