Edge Device Event Log Attestation for Offline Trust Verification

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Solution Overview

Problem

Distributed Edge Computing Devices face challenges in maintaining operational availability and security due to geographically remote locations, unreliable connectivity and power, physical attacks, and software integrity issues, which existing attestation methods struggle to address effectively.

Innovation Solution

A method using platform configurable registers (PCRs) in a TPM system to measure and verify the boot chain, detect discrepancies, and ensure secure access to resources, even in air-gapped environments, by comparing actual and expected values, and employing a self-locking mechanism to protect encrypted volumes.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If Edge Computing Devices operate in geographically remote locations with limited manual access, then operational availability is improved, but security monitoring and trust verification become more difficult

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveoperational availabilityVSAvoidsecurity monitoring
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDifficulty of detecting and measuring

Solution Approach 1:

The Edge Computing Device performs self-attestation by automatically measuring its own boot chain components and generating attestation evidence without requiring manual intervention. The device independently verifies its own trustworthiness and reports status to the Trusted Controller, enabling autonomous security monitoring in remote locations.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements continuous feedback loops where the Edge Computing Device periodically reports its attestation status and operational state to the Trusted Controller. This enables remote monitoring and detection of security anomalies through automated status reporting and comparison against expected values.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

2Duration of action of stationary object

If connectivity between Edge Computing Devices and Trusted Controller is unreliable, then operational continuity is improved, but real-time attestation and trust verification deteriorate

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveoperational continuityVSAvoidtrust verification
Core Design Contradiction:
Duration of action of stationary objectVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The Edge Computing Device performs boot chain measurements and generates attestation evidence in advance during the boot process, before connectivity is established. This preliminary attestation allows the device to prove its trustworthiness as soon as connectivity is restored, without requiring continuous real-time verification.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The system caches attestation evidence and expected values locally on the Edge Computing Device and Trusted Controller respectively. This cushioning mechanism allows the device to maintain operational continuity during connectivity interruptions and quickly resume trust verification when connection is restored, without real-time dependency.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #11Beforehand cushioning (Prior cushioning)

3Ease of repair

If software upgrades are performed remotely, then ease of maintenance is improved, but software integrity and security during updates deteriorate

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesoftware maintenanceVSAvoidsoftware integrity
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of repairVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The system measures and records the attestation evidence of the current software state before performing remote upgrades. This preliminary measurement creates a baseline for comparison, allowing verification that the upgrade process maintains software integrity and that the device remains trustworthy after updates.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The Edge Computing Device continuously reports its software state and attestation status to the Trusted Controller during and after remote upgrades. This feedback mechanism enables real-time monitoring of software integrity and detection of any unauthorized modifications during the maintenance process.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

4Adaptability or versatility

If Edge Computing Devices are deployed in physically accessible locations, then operational flexibility is improved, but vulnerability to physical attacks increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedeployment flexibilityVSAvoidphysical attack vulnerability
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The Edge Computing Device autonomously measures its own hardware and software state through TPM-based attestation, generating cryptographic proof of its trustworthiness. This self-verification capability compensates for the increased physical accessibility risk by enabling continuous automated monitoring of the device's actual state without requiring constant physical security personnel.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Solution Approach 2:

The TPM (Trusted Platform Module) acts as an intermediary that securely isolates and protects sensitive operations such as key generation and boot chain measurement from physical tampering. This hardware-based security boundary allows the device to be deployed in physically accessible locations while maintaining cryptographic proof of its untampered state.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentUS20250355987A1Event log-based attestation for distributed edge devices
Publication Date: 2025.11.20 ZEDEDA INC
  • US20250355987A1 patent drawing
  • US20250355987A1 patent drawing
  • US20250355987A1 patent drawing

AI summary

A computer-implemented method may be used to establish trustworthiness of an Edge Computing Device. The method may include, at one or more storage devices, storing expected values pertaining to aspects of the Edge Computing Device. The method may further include, at one or more hardware processing devices, receiving the expected values, receiving an Event Log from the Edge Computing Device, extracting actual values from the Event Log, and comparing the actual values with the expected values to determine whether the actual values match the expected values. The method may further include, at one or more communication devices, responsive to determining whether the actual values match the expected values, transmitting an indication of whether the Edge Computing Device is trustworthy.