Electronic Device Fault Injection Detection with Power and Clock Monitors

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing electronic devices face challenges in efficiently and reliably detecting fault injection attacks, particularly due to their localized nature and the need for cost-effective, low-power solutions that can be integrated into existing systems.

Innovation Solution

An electronic device with distributed detectors, such as D flip-flops, monitoring power supply and clock periods, coupled to an evaluation device like a comparator, to detect timing violations caused by fault injections, specifically set-up and hold violations, which are efficient, low-power, and easily integrated.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If distributed detectors are used to detect local fault injection attacks, then detection coverage and reliability are improved, but device complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:

Improveattack detection reliabilityVSAvoiddetector distribution complexity

Core Design Contradiction:

ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The electronic device is divided into multiple zones with detectors distributed throughout, allowing local fault injection attacks to be detected at the specific location where they occur. Each detector independently monitors its local region, and the evaluation device aggregates results from all detectors to provide comprehensive attack detection coverage.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #1Segmentation

2Reliability

If comprehensive attack detection is implemented, then security reliability is improved, but power consumption increases

Engineering Contradiction:

Improveattack detection reliabilityVSAvoiddetector power consumption

Core Design Contradiction:

ReliabilityVSUse of energy by moving object

Solution Approach 1:

The detectors utilize the device's existing operational signals (power supply voltage and clock period) as their monitoring inputs, rather than requiring separate dedicated sensing circuits. This self-service approach allows the detectors to function using signals already present in the system, minimizing additional power consumption while maintaining comprehensive attack detection capability.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #25Self-service

3Reliability

If comprehensive attack detection is implemented, then security reliability is improved, but manufacturing cost increases

Engineering Contradiction:

Improveattack detection reliabilityVSAvoidmanufacturing cost

Core Design Contradiction:

ReliabilityVSEase of manufacture

Solution Approach 1:

The detectors are designed to monitor multiple parameters (power supply voltage and clock period) simultaneously using the same hardware components. The evaluation device also performs multiple functions by evaluating timing violations from multiple detectors and determining both the presence and location of attacks. This multi-functionality reduces the need for separate dedicated components, thereby lowering manufacturing costs while maintaining comprehensive attack detection.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

Data Source

PatentEP4586116A1Electronic device with fault injection attack detection

Publication Date: 2025.07.16 NXP BV

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Figure 3A~4

AI summary

It is described an electronic device (100), comprising: i) a detector (110), configured to monitor a power supply and/or a clock period; and ii) an evaluation device (120), coupled to the detector (110), and configured to evaluate the monitoring result with respect to a timing violation caused by a fault injection (FI) attack.