Electronic Vote Security via Dual-Key Validation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Electronic voting systems face security issues regarding the integrity and sincerity of voting data, particularly due to the use of shared encryption keys and lack of uninterrupted encryption, making them vulnerable to manipulation and interception.
Innovation Solution
A method involving temporary and validation ballots encrypted with public keys, where the validation ballot is decrypted using a private key, allowing the voting entity to verify and validate their vote, ensuring uninterrupted encryption and double encryption for enhanced security.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of manufacture
If the same encryption keys are used for each voter in electronic voting systems, then the system is easier to implement and manage, but the security and integrity of voting data is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The patent divides the encryption key management into separate components: each voter receives a unique public key pair (voting public key and validation public key), and the system uses multiple encryption layers. This segmentation allows individual key management for each voter while maintaining system-wide security, resolving the contradiction between ease of implementation and security.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements preliminary key distribution where voters receive their public key pairs before voting, and the system pre-establishes the cryptographic infrastructure. This preliminary action ensures that security measures are in place before voting begins, making the system both secure and easier to manage during the actual voting process.
2Device complexity
If encryption and transmission of ballots are carried out only on the voter's computer, then the system is simpler, but the ballot is vulnerable to interception and manipulation during transmission
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces an intermediary validation server that receives encrypted ballots, decrypts them using the voter's private key, validates the ballot, and then re-encrypts it with a new public key before storing in the ballot box. This intermediary action ensures integrity during transmission while maintaining system simplicity.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements nested encryption where the ballot is first encrypted with the voter's public key, then the validation server wraps it with additional encryption layers. This nested structure provides multiple security layers without significantly increasing system complexity, protecting against interception and manipulation.
3Productivity
If no check of data integrity is carried out on encrypted ballots, then the processing is faster, but the sincerity and integrity of voting data cannot be guaranteed
Solution Approach 1:
The patent performs integrity validation as a preliminary action during the validation phase, before the ballot is stored in the final ballot box. The validation server decrypts the ballot, validates its integrity using cryptographic signatures, and only then proceeds to re-encryption and storage. This preliminary validation ensures integrity without significantly impacting overall processing speed.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements a feedback mechanism where the validation server sends validation results back to the voter, allowing the voter to confirm that their ballot was correctly received and validated. This feedback loop ensures integrity while maintaining efficient processing through automated validation.
4Reliability
If software embedded on the internet browser is used for uninterrupted encryption as recommended by CNIL, then the security requirements are met, but the system becomes more complex and vulnerable to browser-based attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The patent replaces the mechanical approach of embedding encryption software in the browser with a cryptographic substitution approach using public key infrastructure. The encryption and validation operations are performed through cryptographic protocols exchanged between the voter's browser and the validation server, meeting security requirements without the complexity and vulnerabilities of embedded browser software.
Data Source
Figure 1~3
AI summary
The invention relates to a method for securing and verifying an electronic vote, the method being implemented by computer means and comprising: - a step of receiving a temporary ballot, during which a temporary ballot is received from a voting entity, the temporary ballot being encrypted using a public voting encryption key, - a step of receiving a validation ballot, during which a validation ballot is received from said voting entity, the validation ballot being encrypted using a public validation encryption key, - a decryption step, during which the validation ballot is decrypted using a private validation key associated with said public validation encryption key, - a validation step,during which a validation request generated from the decrypted validation ballot is sent to said voting entity, the previous steps being repeated until validation of the validation request by said voting entity, following which the encrypted temporary ballot is registered as the final ballot pending its counting.